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Credit Reform and the States: 
The Vital Role of Attorneys General 
Mter Dodd-Frank 
Mark Totten• 
ABSTRACT: Congress employed multiple strategies in the wake of the Great 
Recession to provide greater protections for consumers in the financial 
marketplace. One strategy aimed at agency design and resulted in creation of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Another strategy created new 
substantive prohibitions and corresponding rulemaking powers. A third 
strategy channeled the forces of federalism, placing a limit on agency 
preemption and empowering state attorneys general to enforce federal law. 
Scholars have focused on the first two strategies, plus the new constraints on 
preemption, but so far have not given sustained attention to the role of states 
as co-enforcers of federal consumer financial protection law. This Article seeks 
to fill that void, focusing on implementation and charting a path for 
normative assessment. 
I begin by placing this dual-enforcement scheme within the context of recent 
history and the evolving infrastructure for consumer financial protection in 
the United States. I then consider several interpretive issues to account for the 
substantive, procedural, and remedial powers Congress placed in the hands of 
state attorneys general. Recognizing that the success of this concurrent-
enforcement regime will depend in part on early coordination, I next identifY 
several implementation priorities necessary to create a scheme that is both 
effective and efficient. Finally, I identifY key questions and offer preliminary 
observations toward a normative assessment of this scheme and its 
implications both for consumer finance and American federalism. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to 
Prentiss Cox, Jennifer Epperson, Glen Staszewski, James Sullivan, Jim Tierney, Art Wilmarth, 
workshop participants at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law Junior 
Faculty Exchange, and my colleagues who participated in the Michigan State University College 
of Law Summer Workshop Series. In addition, I am grateful for several senior officials in state 
and federal government who agreed to interviews and provided critical insight on interpretive 
and implementation issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
States are once again poised to play a vital role protecting consumers in 
the financial marketplace. For decades, state common law was the only 
means of redress. As states began to craft safeguards for the law books, so 
did Congress. At times the states were cooperators. At other times they were 
competitors. Beginning in the mid-1ggos, and over the next decade, 
however, federal banking agencies preempted state actions against federally 
chartered depositories and their subsidiaries. In the shadow of federal 
inaction, the states were often helpless to stop the most egregious abuses 
leading to the 2008 economic crisis. Congress's primary response to the 
Great Recession was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act or Act).' Among other reforms, 
the Act secures important powers for the states. 
The reach of the Dodd-Frank Act is broad. It covers not only financial 
markets and the institutions that participate in those markets, but also 
individual consumer products such as mortgages, credit cards, student loans, 
gift cards, and personal banking. From Wall Street to Main Street, the 
legislation re-defines the landscape. In particular, the Act employs three 
strategies to strengthen consumer financial protection. First, it addresses 
root failures through institutional design. Most important, Congress created 
one agency-the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB")-
that possesses both the authority and motivation to protect consumers. • 
Second, the Act creates new substantive rules that shape how businesses and 
consumers participate in the market. And third, Congress harnessed the 
forces of federalism by placing limits on agency preemption and 
empowering states to enforce federal law. 
To this point in time, attention has focused on the first two strategies 
and the limits on agency preemption.3 While scholars have recently begun 
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). . . 
2. I borrow the language of "authority and motivation" from Warren and Bar-Gill. See 
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 85 (2008). By 
empowering one agency to protect consumers, Congress aimed to overcome past hindrances: 
motivated administrative actors that lacked the legal authority to protect consumers, or 
authorized actors that lacked the motivation to act because of conflicting incentives. 
3· See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011 ); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2; 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption and Consumer Financial Protection: Past 
and Future, 3 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 25 (2012); Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic 
Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 13 27 
(2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REv. 521, 553-56 (2012); 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of 
Financial Seroices, 36]. CORP. L. 893, 897--919 (2011) (raising the role of states as co-enforcers, 
but focusing on preemption). 
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to examine the general contours of concurrent-enforcement regimes,4 no 
one has given sustained attention to the role of states and state attorneys 
general ("SAGs") as co-enforcers of federal law under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Addressing this gap is critical if only because the Act creates one of the 
largest dual-enforcement regimes ever, but also because the states play a vital 
role in reforming the system. Concurrent-enforcement powers are the 
necessary complement to the strategies of institutional design and statutory 
rulemaking. I attempt to fill this void in the literature on dual-enforcement 
powers by addressing key interpretive issues and implementation priorities, 
while also considering the implications of this reform for consumer finance 
and the role of concurrent enforcement in American federalism.5 
In Part I, "Infrastructure," I sketch the system of consumer financial 
protection in the United States and its recent history. This brief account 
traces the role of the states in consumer financial protection to provide 
context for the reforms Congress passed in 2010. In Part II, "Innovation," I 
describe the substantive, procedural, and remedial powers Congress placed 
in the hands of state attorneys general, addressing critical interpretive issues 
concerning the scope of these powers. The gap between a statutory grant of 
power and an effective and efficient concurrent-enforcement regime, 
however, is potentially wide. While federal agencies typically carry out a 
congressional mandate, in the case of state enforcement, implementation 
depends on the independent decisions of fifty state attorneys general, who 
are very different actors than the expert administrators who populate the 
executive branch. How states exercise these powers, and the systems in place 
to support state enforcement, are critical in determining the success or 
failure of reform. In Part III, "Implementation," I therefore identifY several 
system-building priorities. Lastly, in Part IV, "Implications," I identify key 
questions and offer a few preliminary observations toward a normative 
assessment of this scheme and its implications both for consumer finance 
and American federalism. 
4· See generaUy Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, Sg TEx. L. REv. 15 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 6g8 (2011 ); Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach 
(with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 U. MINN. L. REv. 1343 (2013); Amy Widman, 
Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement 
Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REv. 165 (2010); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of Concurrent Public 
Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDozo L. REv. 53 (2011). 
5· The Dodd-Frank concurrent-enforcement scheme bears some resemblance to a 
concurrent regulatory regime insofar as the Act also constrains the power of federal agencies to 
preempt state consumer financial protection laws and thereby opens a broader space for state 
regulation than what the states experienced in the last two decades. 
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I. INFRASTRUCTURE 
The modern legal framework for consumer financial protection in the 
United States has evolved over the past century, most recently through the 
Dodd-Frank Act and especially Title X of that Act. I briefly describe this 
evolution as prelude to examining the innovations Congress introduced by 
giving states concurrent-enforcement powers. 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION PRE-2 o I o 
Consumer financial protection in the United States is a patchwork of 
state and federal law.6 The earliest means of redress arose out of state 
common law as tort and contract remedies, such as claims of breach of 
contract, unconscionability, fraud, and fraudulent misrepresentation.? The 
common law, however, proved inadequate for several reasons. First, 
contractual claims required privity between buyer and seller, but increasing 
social mobility often made this requirement difficult to establish.s Second, 
common law judges reserved the unconscionability doctrine for only the 
most egregious cases.9 Next, tort claims required the plaintiff to leap a 
difficult mens rea hurdle, by requiring proof that the seller had intent to 
deceive. 10 Finally, common law claims in tort required an actual injury, a 
requirement which precluded prospective relief.•• These and other 
shortcomings spurred the development of statutory protections. 
The most important early reform was the Federal Trade Commission 
Act ("FTCA") of 1914, which created the Federal Trade Commission 
("FTC") and which remains the centerpiece of modern consumer 
protection law at the federal level.' 2 As originally passed, this law had two 
6. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection 
Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 664 
(2008) ("There is no uniformity and no consistency among the various consumer protection 
laws and how they are enforced because there is no national consensus on what laws are 
necessary to protect consumers and who should enforce those laws."); Edward M. Crane et al., 
U.S. Consumer Protection Law: A Federalist Patchwork, 78 DEF. COUNS.J. 305, 305 (2011) ("Unlike 
many foreign jurisdictions, the United States lacks a singular, comprehensive consumer 
protection code. Consumer protection law in the United States is instead a patchwork of federal 
and state laws."). 
7· See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-
FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REv. 163, 168-69 (2011 ); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-
Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2005);joshua D. Wright, 
The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE LJ. 2216, 
2226-27 (2012). 
8. Butler & Wright, supra note 7. at 169. 
9· Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 71. 
1 o. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 7, at 6. 
11. /d.at7. 
12. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2oo6)). 
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limitations. First, it only prohibited "unfair methods of competition."'3 This 
language focused the agency on antitrust violations. The Supreme Court 
reinforced this narrow focus, holding in 1931 that the agency lacked 
authority to issue a cease-and-desist order with regard to false advertising 
that caused harm to consumers but did not present a competitive injury.'4 In 
response, Congress amended the FTCA to also prohibit "unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices" ("UDAP"), a broad standard giving the agency greater 
flexibility to protect consumers.'5 In 1975, Congress clarified that the agency 
not only had power to bring individual actions, but also to promulgate rules 
enforcing this prohibition.'6 
Second, the FTCA as passed and amended has never allowed the FTC to 
enforce its powers against banks, and for several decades considerable doubt 
persisted as to whether any agency could enforce the Act's UDAP ban 
against federal depositories.'7 In the same 1975 Act recognizing the FTC's 
rulemaking power, however, Congress charged the various banking 
regulators to take complaints for alleged UDAP violations and charged the 
Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") to promulgate rules under the prohibition.' 8 
Moreover, Congress required the Fed to "promulgate substantially similar 
regulations" whenever the FTC prescribed a rule under section 5·'9 
Congress placed enforcement of the UDAP regulations in the hands of the 
federal banking agencies.•o Overall, the federal UDAP ban coupled with 
rulemaking power is a potent and flexible tool: an administrative law 
approach that escapes many of the weaknesses inherent in common law 
remedies and allows industry-wide regulation rather than just case-by-case 
enforcement. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the states increased efforts to protect 
consumers."' The 1975 reforms under the FTC Improvement Act were in 
part motivated by a growing concern that the FTC was the victim of 
13. /d. at 38 Stat. at 719. 
14. FTC v. Raladam, Co., 283 U.S. 643,653 (1931). 
15. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1gg8, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § g, 52 Stat. III, III (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012)). 
16. The FTC began issuing Trade Regulation Rules ("TRRs") in 1962, allowing it to 
regulate an entire industry rather than just a particular entity. Industry challenged the agency's 
authority for rulemaking in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), which held that the agency possessed such power. Congress subsequently codified this 
holding. See FTC Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2193-
98 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012)). 
17. See Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking Agency 
Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58 Bus. LAW. 1243, 
1243-49 (2003). 
18. FTC Improvement Act§ 202. 
19. /d. 
20. /d. 
21. See generally Budnitz, supra note 6, at 674-77; Butler & Wright, supra note 7, at 167-73; 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 7, at 15-32. 
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regulatory capture!• A growing consumer movement, the limitations of 
common law remedies, and a concern that the substantive protections 
offered in federal law may not have been sufficient, all fueled the adoption 
of state-level consumer protection acts. •3 By 1981 every state had adopted 
such legislation, many modeled after the federal UDAP ban and sometimes 
referred to as "little-FTC Acts."•4 
Although the level of protection provided in these state laws varied, they 
had several advantages over their federal counterpart from the perspective 
of consumer advocates!5 Most important, they included a private right of 
action and recoupment of attorney's fees, allowing consumers to seek 
redress in the courts rather than depending on action by the ITC. In 
addition, they often permitted a broader range of remedies, including 
actual, statutory, and even treble or punitive damages, and often allowed for 
class actions to provide redress for small but widespread injuries. 
In addition to the federal UDAP ban and similar state consumer 
protection acts, both Congress and the states have passed laws targeting 
specific issues. The earliest federal law designed to protect consumers in the 
financial marketplace was the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), passed in 
1g68!6 TILA adopts a disclosure strategy and requires creditors to state the 
terms and costs of credit, allowing product comparison and cost 
calculation!7 In addition, Congress has regulated other areas including 
credit reporting,•8 credit billing,•g debt collection,3° credit cards,3' credit 
2 2. See Butler & Wright, supra note 7, at 167-68. 
23. !d. at 167-69. 
24. !d. at 169; DEE PRIGDEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAw Appendix 3A (2011) (listing state consumer protection statutes, including date of 
enactment and citation). 
25. See generaUy Budnitz, supra note 6, at 674-77; Butler & Wright, supra note 7, at 167-73; 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 7, at 15-32. 
26. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 9o-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2oo6) ). TILA is Title I within a larger legislative package 
known as the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 9o-321, 82 Stat. 146 
( 1968). Congress has amended TILA multiple times. See Crane et al., supra note 6, at 32o-21. 
27. TILA § 102(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012)) ("It is the 
purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will 
be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit 
billing and credit card practices."). 
28. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1136 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2012)) (amending CCPA); Consumer 
Credit Reporting Reform Act (CCRRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C) (amending FCRA); Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681y (2012)) (amendingFCRA). 
29. See, e.g., Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1151 (1975) 
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2012)) (amending Tll..A). 
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repair,3• access to credit,33 electronic transfer of funds,34 and real estate 
transactions.35 Congress dispersed enforcement powers under these statutes. 
For example, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fed had rulemaking powers 
under TllA36 and nine federal agencies held enforcement powers, with FTC 
in the lead.37 Similarly, many states also adopted laws targeting specific 
threats, like predatory lending.3s 
B. CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION 
Although some observers had already discerned trouble in the structure 
of consumer financial protection, the recession that began in 2008 shed a 
bright light on cracks in the foundation.39 The fissures were at least two: 
federal regulators failing to exercise their rulemaking and enforcement 
powers, and then preventing states from enforcing state laws. 
Inaction at the Federal Reserve Board during the critical years leading 
up to the crisis is a telling example. The Fed had authority to issues rules 
and stop abuses in the mortgage lending market which fueled the crisis, 
30. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-16920 (2oo6)) (amending CCPA). 
31. See, e.g., Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act (FCCCA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
10o-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending 
TILA); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD 
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
32. See, e.g., Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679i (2012)). 
33· See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (2012)) (amending CCPA to add 
Title VII). 
34· See, e.g., Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 
(1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1693) (amending CCPA to add Title IX). 
35· See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 
1724 ( 1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012) ). 
36. TILA, Pub. L. No. 9o-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f(2006)). 
37· TILA § 108. 
38. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 361-78 
(2005) (reviewing the different state responses, starting with North Carolina in 1999); see also 
Budnitz, supra note 6, at 676 ("In addition to UDAP statutes, states have enacted laws regulating 
many specific types of transactions including retail installment sales contracts and motor vehicle 
sales financing. States also regulate home solicitation sales and usury. While these statutes 
provide consumers another layer of protection besides the UDAP laws, they have a very narrow 
scope." (citations omitted)). 
39· For assessments of systemic failure prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, see ENGEL & MCCOY, 
supra note 3; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 79-97; Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive 
Practice Enforcement in Financial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279, 297-300 (2009); 
McCoy et al., supra note 3; Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 897-919. 
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especially in the market for subprime and Alt-A mortgages.4° As mentioned 
earlier, the Fed had rulemaking power to prevent unfair and deceptive 
practices under the FTCA.4• This power, however, was originally limited to 
banks and did not reach nonbank lenders even though abuses by such 
lenders were rampant. In the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 
1994 ("HOEPA"), however, Congress gave the Fed power to issue rules 
preventing unfair and deceptive acts or practices committed by any 
mortgage originator.4• Despite awareness of the risky lending practices in 
these markets throughout the decade, it was not until the crisis erupted and 
with a change in the chairmanship that the Fed finally exercised its UDAP 
powers in July 2008.43 The new rule had limited reach and by then the 
subprime lending market had shut down.44 Other federal regulators 
demonstrated the same failure to exercise their rulemaking powers, and also 
to exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers to stop toxic lending 
practices.45 
The second crack in the foundation of consumer financial protection 
was the dramatic move by federal agencies to preempt state laws aimed at 
the abusive lending practices federal regulators refused to address.46 States 
had been at the forefront of consumer protection in the banking field for 
40. These two types of loans are loosely defined. "Subprime" loans are targeted at 
borrowers who have poor credit history and lack the savings to make a down payment. "Alt-A" 
loans ("Alternative A-paper," where "A-paper" loans are prime loans) are marketed to persons 
who do not quality for prime lending because they pose some level of risk, although less risk 
than subprime borrowers. Recipients of Alt-A loans may have minor credit issues or otherwise 
are unable or unwilling to document their assets or income. These forms of non prime lending 
spiked in the years leading up to the economic crisis and were a major cause of the recession. In 
1995 subprime lending accounted for $65 billion in loans; by 2006 it accounted for $6oo 
billion. Likewise, Alt-A loans went from $6o billion in 2001 to $400 billion in 2006. See Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the 
SubprimeFinancial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963, 1015-16 (2009). 
41. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
42. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-325, §§ 151-158, 108 Stat. 2190, 219o--g8 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.). See also 
ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 3. at 194-g6; Wilmarth, supra note 3. at 898-900. 
43· See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 3, at 195-g6; Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 899. 
44· See Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 899. 
45· The Federal Reserve Board failed to regulate nonbank mortgage lenders that were 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, over which the Fed had authority. See Wilmarth, supra 
note 3· at 900-01. The Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), which regulated federally 
chartered or insured savings and loans, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
which regulated federally chartered banks, demonstrated the same inaction. See Keith R. Fisher, 
Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection 
Laws, 29 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981, 991-94. (2oo6); McCoy et al, supra note 3, at 151-56; 
Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 903-<>6. 
46. For general accounts of federal agency preemption leading up to the economic crisis, 
see ENGEL & McCOY, supra note 3, at 157-59; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 79--83; McCoy 
et al., supra note 3, at 1348-51; Sharkey, supra note 3. at 553-56; Wilmarth, supra note 3· at 
91(}-15. 
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over a century, including against nationally chartered banks. Moreover, in 
the absence of federal action, and eyeing the ever-growing threat, states 
tried to act both by passing anti-predatory lending legislation and by 
bringing enforcement actions, such as the multistate actions against 
Ameriquest and Household lnternational.47 In many cases, however, they 
were blocked by aggressive federal agencies that aimed to insulate the 
institutions they chartered from state consumer protections. 
In the early 1ggos, all mortgage lenders had to comply with state laws. 
Beginning in 1gg6, and over the next decade, however, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision ("OTS") and the Office of Comptroller of the Currency 
("OCC") sought to free federally chartered depositories from state 
regulation. In 1996 the OTS issued a regulation that declared the agency 
occupied the entire field for lending regulation over federal savings 
associations,48 and then in 1996 applied the same relief to subsidiaries of 
these institutions.49 The OCC followed the same path, preempting most 
state laws in 2004 that previously applied to national banks and their 
subsidiaries,so and then barring enforcement actions by states against these 
institutions, even with respect to non-preempted state laws.5' The twin 
strategies of preemption and inaction especially aggrieved the statesY 
These cracks in the foundation of consumer financial protection 
stemmed from at least two design flaws in the federal regulatory structure: 
conflicting missions and misaligned incentives. The primary mission of the 
banking agencies is to protect the "safety and soundness" of the institutions 
they oversee.s3 Although a broad interpretation of this mission might 
47· See supra note 38; Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 909-10; Kirstin Downey, Mortgage Lender 
Settles Lawsuit, WASH. POST Oan. 24, 2oo6), http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ content/article/ 2oo6/o1/23/ AR2oo6I2301523.html. 
48. Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951 (Sept. 30, 1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
49· Subsidiaries and Equity Investments, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,561 (Dec. 18, 1996) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
50. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904 Oan. 13, 2004). 
51. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 Oan. 13, 2004). 
52. See Letter from Nat'! Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., to Mr. John Walsh, Acting Comptroller, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Qune 27, 2011), available at 
http:/ /www.naag.org/naag-responds-to-occ-proposed-financial-reform-regulations.php ("Over 
the last decade, state Attorneys General have vigorously opposed the OCC's aggressive 
campaign to preempt state consumer protection laws. In 2003, all 50 state Attorneys General 
filed comments on the OCC's proposed preemption rules. Those rules attempted to preempt 
consumer protection laws that the states had enforced for years in the financial marketplace, 
including against national banks."). 
53· See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
:142, § 132, 105 Stat. 2236, 2267-70 (1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § I831p-1 
(2012)) (requiring federal banking agencies, for all insured depository institutions, to 
prescribe safety and soundness standards concerning operational and managerial standards; 
asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation standards; and compensation standards). The 
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include consumer financial protection, banking agencies concemed with 
safety and soundness focus primarily on the banks' stability and 
profitability.s4 The commitment to consumer protection was, at best, a 
distant second; more often, the agencies perceived consumer protection to 
conflict with their primary mission. 
The consequences of this conflict for consumer protection were 
heightened by a second design flaw: misaligned incentives. Under the "dual" 
banking system in the United States, financial institutions can organize as 
banks, thrifts, or credit unions, under state or federal charters.ss Moreover, 
institutions often have mobility and can move between regulators based on 
the favorability of the corresponding regulatory regime. Both the OCC and 
the OTS received funding almost exclusively based on assessments paid by 
the institutions they regulated.s6 This arrangement created a classic race to 
the bottom, where the banking agencies sought to increase market share by 
minimizing consumer protections.s7 
C. THE DODD-FRANK RECONSTRUCTION 
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to remedy these flaws through a 
major reconstruction of the consumer financial protection structure in the 
United States.ss Congress employed several strategies, including institutional 
design. The Act creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as a new, 
independent federal agency located within the Federal Reserve,s9 while 
ensuring the agency's autonomy.6o To promote the agency's independence, 
Congress created a set funding stream as a percentage of the Fed's annual 
earnings.6 ' Moreover, the President appoints a Director, subject to the 
"banking agencies" (also referred to as the "prudential regulators") include the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the 
former Office of Thrift Supervision, which the Dodd-Frank Act abolished. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5481(24). 
54· See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at go. 
55· See generally DONALD RESSEGUIE, BANKING LAW§ 1.04 (2012). 
56. See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 3, at 15g-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 93-
94; Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 915. 
57· For several examples of state banks that converted to national banks after OCC issued 
its preemptions rules, see ENGEL & McCOY, supra note 3, at 15g-61. 
58. See generally Michael B. Mierzewski et a!., The Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products and Seroices, 
127 BANKING LJ. 722 (2010); Wilmarth, supra note 3, at g2o-48. 
59· Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. III-203, 
§ IOII, 124 Stat. 1376 (201o). 
6o. /d.§ 1012(c). 
61. /d.§w17(a). 
IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. gg:115 
advice and consent of the Senate, for a five-year term.6• The Director is 
subject to removal only for cause.63 
Having witnessed the deleterious effects of a conflicted mission within 
the banking agencies, Congress charged the CFPB with the sole mission of 
protecting consumers. "The Bureau shall seek to implement and, where 
applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the 
purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer 
financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial 
products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive."64 
In addition, Congress departed from the institutional fragmentation 
that marked the consumer financial protection system leading up to the 
economic crisis, giving CFPB broad and comprehensive authority to 
"regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or 
services under the Federal consumer financial laws."65 This transfer of 
consumer protection powers to the CFPB is sweeping. With a few 
exceptions,66 the Act defines "Federal consumer financiallaw[s]" to include 
nearly all laws that safeguard consumer participation in the financial 
marketplace, and any regulations under those laws.67 These laws include, 
amongst others, TILA, HOEPA, the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 
and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA").68 Further, Title X 
also creates new protections, including a broad prohibition on "unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]" ("UDAAPs").69 This prohibition 
extends to any "covered person," which the Act defines as "any person that 
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service,"7o 
as well as any "service provider," which means "any person that provides a 
62. !d.§ 1011. 
63. !d. § 1011 (c) (3). 
64. 12U.S.C.§sS11(a)(2012). 
6s. !d.§ s491 (a). 
66. Persons and services exempted from the agency's authority include merchants or 
sellers of nonfinancial goods or services that extend credit directly to consumers for the sole 
purpose of allowing consumers to purchase those nonfinancial goods or services, real estate 
brokers, sellers of manufactured or modular homes, accountants and tax preparers, attorneys, 
employee benefit and compensation plan providers, insurance and reinsurance providers, and 
persons regulated by a state securities commission. !d.§§ ss17(a)( 1), s481 (IS) (C) (i). 
67. !d. §s481(14). For a list of the rules over which the CFPB has authority, see 
Identification of Enforceable Rules and Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 43.s6g (July 21, 2011 ). 
68. 12 u.s.c. § S481 ( 12). 
6g. !d.§ SS36(a)(1)(B). 
70. !d. § s481 (6). Financial products and services include the extension of credit and 
servicing of loans; real estate settlement services; taking deposits; transmitting or exchanging 
funds; selling, providing, or issuing gift cards or other store value or payment instruments; 
providing check cashing, collection, and guaranty services; payment or other financial data 
processing products or services; financial advisory services; and the collection and provision of 
consumer report and credit history information. !d. § s481 (IS). 
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material service to a covered person" in the offering of such product or 
service.?• 
The CFPB's authority with respect to the federal consumer financial 
laws includes rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement powers. Congress 
gave the CFPB exclusive rulemaking power,?• subject to override by a two-
thirds vote of the Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC").73 In 
addition, for the first time Congress gave a federal agency power to supervise 
nondepositories.74 These institutions include many mortgage lenders and 
servicers, private student lenders, payday lenders, and any "larger 
participant" in the market for consumer financial products and services, 
which the CFPB has defined to include the major credit reporting agencies7s 
and debt collectors.76 Moreover, the agency has supervisory power over 
depositories with assets greater than $10 billion.77 
Finally, the CFPB also has extensive enforcement powers. With respect 
to the above-mentioned nondepositories, the CFPB has exclusive 
enforcement authority among federal regulators.78 As to depositories, the 
CFPB has primary enforcement authority with respect to depositories with 
assets greater than $10 billion.79 For depositories with less than $10 billion 
in assets, the prudential regulator retains exclusive enforcement authority 
among federal regulators. Bo In bringing enforcement actions, the agency has 
a wide range of tools to issue civil investigative demands,8• bring 
71. !d.§ 5481 (26). 
72. !d.§ 5512(b) (1 ), (4). The one exception is concurrent powers between the CFPB and 
the FTC, and a statutory requirement that the two agencies coordinate rulemaking. !d. 
§5581(b)(5). 
73· !d. § 5513(a), (c). The Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") includes the 
Treasury Secretary, the Fed Chairman, the Comptroller of the Currency, the CFPB Director, 
the FTC Chairman, the FDIC Chairperson, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Chairperson, the Federal Housing Finance Agency Director, the National Credit Union 
Administration Chairman, and a presidential appointee with insurance expertise. !d.§ 5491 (b). 
74· ld. § 5514(a). 
75· Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,874 
Ouly 20, 2012). 
76. Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Market, 77 Fed. Reg. 
65,775 (Oct. 31, 2012). 
77· !d. § 5515. Depositories with assets of less than $10 billion are supervised by their 
prudential regulators for compliance with Federal consumer financial law, although the CFPB 
has a limited role to include examiners on a sampling basis. !d. § 5516. For a list of depositories 
that the CFPB currently supervises, see CFPB, CFPB DEPOSITORY [INSTITUTIONS] (CFPB DI'S) 
BASED ON 6/30/12 TOTAL AsSETS (2012), available at http:/ /files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/ 20 1206_CFPB_depository-institutions-list.pdf. 
78. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c). 
79· /d.§ 5515(c). 
So. !d. § 5516(d). See supra note 53 and accompanying text for an explanation of a 
"prudential regulator." 
81. 12 u.s.c. § 5562 (d). 
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administrative proceedingss• or civil actions, 83 and seek a range of remedies 
including rescission or reformation of contracts, refund of money or return 
of real property, restitution, disgorgement, damages, public notification, 
limitation on future activities, and civil penalties.84 
These reforms aim to create an agency that exercises its power to 
protect consumers in the financial marketplace. But Congress went further 
in Title X by adopting several new substantive laws governing consumer 
financial products and services. These new rules, including the broad 
UDAAP ban and provisions covering mortgage originators under Title XIV, 
represent a shift from disclosure-based rules to regulation that reaches the 
substance of deals and assesses whether consumers understand the terms 
disclosed. 8s 
Finally, Congress sought to enlist the states by employing federalism-
based strategies, including new limits on agency preemption.86 Rejecting the 
premise that federal law occupies the field, Congress opted for a form of 
conflict preemption. State laws are preempted only to the extent they are 
"inconsistent with the provisions [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act], and then 
only to the extent of the inconsistency."S7 A state provision is not 
inconsistent if the protection it "affords to consumers is greater than the 
protection provided under this title."88 In other words, federal law is a floor, 
not a ceiling. 
II. INNOVATION 
The creation of one federal agency vested with the authority and 
incentives to protect consumers in the financial marketplace, the adoption 
of new substantive rules, and the securing of a space for states to enforce 
state law are all innovations Congress employed to reconstruct the system of 
consumer financial protection in the United States. But Congress also vested 
states-and in particular state attorneys general-with power to enforce 
federal law. Although I will return to this point in Part IV, this innovation 
82. Id. § ss63(d). 
83. Id. § ss64(d). 
84. Id. § ss6s(d). 
85. As Dee Pridgen argues, these rules mark "a sea change, or paradigm shift, in the basic 
underlying theories of consumer protection[, as] reflected in ... the shift from the use of pure 
disclosures under the rational choice theory of economics, to a system based on the more 
realistic view of consumer decision making as revealed by behavioral economics." Dee Pridgen, 
Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Bureau and Stronger Laws, 13 WYo. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=2186o35; see also Jean Braucher, 
Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK.]. CORP. FIN. COM. L. (forthcoming 
2013), available at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=2l268sg. 
86. See Wilmarth, supra note 3, at g2o-48. 
87. 12 U.S.C. § 5551(d). 
88. !d. Congress defined a specific preemption standard for national banks and 
subsidiaries. /d. § ss87. 
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promises several benefits: it serves as a force-multiplier; it places increased 
authority in the hands of state actors who have local knowledge that federal 
actors may lack; and it fosters accountability, democratic participation, and 
innovation. 89 
In this Part, I describe the concurrent-enforcement powers enjoyed by 
SAGs under the Dodd-Frank Act, while considering critical interpretive 
issues that will determine their breadth. I begin by looking at the scope of 
the substantive powers. I then tum to procedural and remedial powers, as 
the ability of states to exercise substantive powers will often depend on 
them. I explore these remedial and procedural powers, along with the 
interpretive issues they raise, against the backdrop of state constitutional, 
statutory, and common law powers that shape the offices of SAGs. 
A. SUBSTANTIVE POWERS 
Congress has experimented in the past with dual-enforcement 
regimes. go Title X, however, is one of the largest dual-enforcement attempts 
to date, and is additionally the first comprehensive scheme in the area of 
consumer protection.9' In four earlier instances Congress gave SAGs limited 
and scattered powers to enforce federal laws affecting consumer finance. In 
1983 Congress amended the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act to give 
SAGs authority to enforce the statute's anti-kickback provision, prohibiting 
any exchange of value for referring business in a real estate transaction.9• 
Several years later Congress amended TILA to require enhanced disclosure 
and trigger special substantive limitations on certain high-cost mortgages.93 
This amendment, called the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 
1994, gave SAGs power to enforce these provisionS.94 Then in 1996 
8g. Most obviously, despite attempts to insulate CFPB from capture, the powers of the 
agency rest in the hands of the Director who is appointed by the President and will likely reflect 
the ideological leanings of a particular administration. See, e.g., Jenna Greene, Youngest Agency 
Has a Lot on the Line, NAT'L LJ. (Oct. 29, 2012}, http:/ /www.law.com/jsp/nlj/Pub 
ArticleNIJjsp?id~1202576494717 ("A director who is more sympathetic to industry concerns 
could essentially 'babysit' the agency." (quoting Patricia Trendacosta, managing partner of 
Frandzel Robins Bloom & Csato)). 
go. See Lemos, supra note 4, at notes 41r-61 and accompanying text; Widman & Cox, supra 
note 4, at 8-27 and accompanying text. 
91. Ashley L. Taylor, Jr. et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the State Attorneys 
General: A Force Multiplier in Consumer Protection Matters, BLOOMBERG L. REP. (May 2 5, 20 1 1), 
http:/ /www.troutrnansanders.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Bloomberg%2oLaw%2oByline. 
pdf ("Coordinated regulatory enforcement among federal and [s]tate governments is not a new 
phenomenon; however, coordination has not been previously contemplated on such grand a 
scale as anticipated under Dodd-Frank."). 
92. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. g8-181, § 461 (c), 97 Stat. 
1153, 1232-33 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 26o7(d)(4) (2012)). 
93· Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-325, §§ 151-158, 108 Stat. 2190, 21go-g8 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.) 
94· ld. § 153(b). 
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Congress gave states power to enforce federal law governing the creation, 
maintenance, and use of consumer credit reports under an amendment to 
the FCRA.9s And finally in 2oog, as a prelude to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Congress gave SAGs authority to enforce any rules the Federal Trade 
Commission prescribed to prevent UDAP in mortgage lending.96 SAGs have 
been especially active enforcing rules that regulate so-called "foreclosure 
rescue" services.97 
Although the 2009 Amendment incorporated by the Dodd-Frank Act is 
an important grant of power, the other three aforementioned, state 
attorney-general enforceable amendments are relatively narrow and have 
remained largely unexercised by the states.98 Prior to passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, state attorneys general played a peripheral, ad hoc role in the 
95· Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2417, 11 o 
Stat. 3435· 3460 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s(c) ( 1) (2006) ). 
96. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 626(b)(1), 123 Stat. 524, 
678-79 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5538(b)(1) (2012)). The story is more 
complicated than the in-text sentence summary suggests. The original 2009 amendment, 
passed on March 11, 2009, required the ITC to issue mortgage rules to prevent UDAP. !d. 
§ 626(a). The amendment did not make clear whether these rules would apply against federally 
chartered depositories. As explained earlier, see Williams & Bylsma, supra note 17, at 1243-49 
and accompanying text, the Federal Trade Commission Act expressly prohibited the 
application of ITC rules to these institutions. In addition, for a short time Congress also gave 
SAGs power to enforce the whole of TILA and any mortgage rules prescribed under it by the 
FTC. Omnibus Appropriations Act§ 626(b)(1). Two months later, however, Congress limited 
this concurrent-enforcement power to only FTC rules meant to prevent UDAP in mortgage 
loans, including loan modification and foreclosure rescue services. Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-1!4, § 511 (a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. 1734, 
1763-64 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5538(a)(3) (2012)). With Title XIV of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress placed the power to make mortgage rules in the hands of the CFPB 
and left SAG's power to enforce these rules largely unchanged. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1097, 124 Stat. 1376, 2!02-Q3 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5538(a)(1) (2012) ). 
97· The CFPB has issued the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services ("MARS") Rule 
(Regulation 0) under this provision, which regulates foreclosure relief and other services. See 
Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (Regulation 0), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1015.1-11 (2011). Among 
other provisions, the MARS Rule prohibits these services from collecting an upfront fee. !d. 
§ 1015.5(a). State attorneys general have actively enforced this prohibition. See, e.g., Bryan 
Cohen, Colo. AG Puts End to Alleged Scheme, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Mar. 22, 2012, 12:14 PM), 
http:/ /legalnewsline.com/ news/ 2 3558 s-colo-ag-puts-end-to-alleged-scheme. 
98. A recent study regarding SAG use of concurrent-enforcement powers found no 
instances where states had acted under RESPA, four instances where states used their FCRA 
powers, and five instances where they used their HOEPA powers. Widman & Cox, supra note 4, 
at 71-72. The limited use of the HOEPA power is in part explained by the narrowness of the 
statute, which applied only to loans meeting high threshold criteria. See Robert B. Avery et a!., 
The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. REs. BULL. A73, 88 (2007) ("In the aggregate, HOEPA related 
lending accounts for a very small proportion of the loan market: HOEPA loans accounted for 
less than 0.1 percent of all the originations of home-secured refinancings and home-
improvement loans reported for 2006 ... ."). To strengthen protection, Congress amended 
HOEPA in the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act§§ 1431-33. 
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enforcement of federal consumer financial protection law. Now, with the 
Act, they have the potential to be lead actors, including the power to enforce 
federal law even when the CFPB lacks authority. 
Title X carves out broad dual-enforcement authority: SAGs are 
empowered "to enforce provisions of this title or regulations issued under 
this title."gg The Act places two limits on this power, one substantive and the 
other procedural. First, the Act prohibits SAGs from enforcing any provision 
of Title X against a federally chartered depository, although it permits states 
"to enforce a regulation prescribed by the Bureau under a provision of this 
title .... "100 Second, as with most concurrent-enforcement regimes, the Act 
requires states to give notice to the CFPB before bringing any enforcement 
action under Title X, and gives the federal agency powers of intervention, 
removal, and appeal. 101 In addition to powers under Title X, SAGs may also 
enforce new substantive rules governing mortgages under Title XIV. 10• I will 
examine these powers in three categories: the power to enforce the general 
UDAAP ban, other federal consumer financial protection laws, and new 
substantive limits on mortgage terms. 
1. UDAAPBan 
The single most important power the Dodd-Frank Act confers on SAGs 
is the power to enforce the Act's new prohibition on any "unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive act or practice," 103 and any rules the CFPB promulgates under 
this prohibition. 104 Like its federal cousin, UDAP, this new prohibition and 
the agency's power to make rules under it provides critical flexibility to 
respond to emerging threats in the market that by design or effect harm 
consumers. 105 At the same time, as with any standard, poor implementation 
can generate uncertainty, chill innovation, and harm consumers. To 
understand the significance of this authority, we must understand the 
evolution of the UDAAP ban out of federal consumer protection law, the 
scope of the new UDAAP provision, and the significance of this allowance in 
light of the authority SAGs currently have under state law to prevent unfair 
and deceptive acts or practices. 
Although it breaks new ground, the UDAAP ban bears a close 
connection to the longstanding prohibition on "unfair or deceptive acts or 
99· 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2012). This power is placed in the hands of the state attorney 
general, but § 5552 (a)( 1) also gives a similar power to "[a] state regulator." /d. 
100. /d.§ 5552(a)(2). 
101. /d.§ 5552(b)(1)(A). 
102. /d.§ 5552. 
103. /d.§ 5536(a) ( 1 )(B). 
104. /d.§§ 5536(a)-(b). 
105. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 84-85 (discussing the benefits of an 
administrative approach under a broad statutory standard). 
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practices" under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 106 Recall 
that the UDAP ban was added to the FTCA in 1938, with Congress giving 
authority over federal depositories to various federal banking regulators. 107 
Title X transferred exclusive rulemaking power to the CFPB, 108 while adding 
a ban on "abusive" acts and practices.•og The CFPB has exclusive 
enforcement authority as to banks with more than $10 billion in assets. 110 In 
addition, Congress created a sphere of largely overlapping enforcement 
authority between the CFPB and the FTC.••• 
Perhaps the most asked question under the UDAAP ban is how the 
CFPB will interpret its scope, especially its new ban on "abusive" acts or 
practices. Both Title X and subsequent agency statements give a reasonably 
clear indication of how the agency will interpret "unfair" and "deceptive." 
The statutory definition of "unfairness"••• is the same definition the FTC has 
long recognized under UDAP.••3 Title X is silent as to the meaning of 
"deceptive," perhaps because the FTCA also does not define the term. The 
106. 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (2oo6). 
107. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
108. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (b); 15 U.S.C. § 1092 (2oo6 & Supp. IV 2011 ). 
109. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B). 
110. !d.§ 5515(a)-(b). 
1 1 1. Title X makes clear that it does not alter or limit the existing powers of the FfC, other 
than the transfer of rulemaking powers under federal consumer financial law. Id. 
§ 5581 (b)(5) (C) (i). Although the FfC does not have authority over banks, savings and loan 
associations, or federal credit unions, the agency and the CFPB still have overlapping authority 
as to a wide range of individuals and institutions involved in consumer finance, including 
nonbank mortgage lenders, private student lenders, credit card companies, payday lenders, and 
credit bureaus. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (FfC power); 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (a)-(b) (CFPB power). 
In each case, the FfC has power under FfCA's UDAP ban, and the CFPB has power under 
Title X's UDAAP ban. On account of this overlap, Title X requires the two agencies to negotiate 
an agreement with respect to rulemaking so as to avoid duplication or conflict between rules 
prescribed by each agency. 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (b) (5) (D). The heads of both agencies signed this 
agreement on January 20, 2012. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU & FED. TRADE COMM'N, 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2012), available at http:/ /files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
20I2/0I/FTC.MOUwSig.I.20.pdf. Moreover, Title X gives the agencies mutual power to 
enforce regulations under both UDAP and UDAAP, as long as the agency otherwise has 
jurisdiction over the person. 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (b)(5)(B)(ii), (C) (ii). 
112. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (c) ( 1 )(A)-(B) (defining "unfair" to require that "the act or practice 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers; and ... such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition"). 
113. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS (1980), available at 
http:/ /www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. Congress later amended the FfCA to 
incorporate this standard in the statute. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-312, §9, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §45(n) 
(2006)). 
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CFPB, however, has made clear' 14 that it intends to follow the FTC's long-
standing definition."5 
Less clear is how CFPB will interpret "abusive," which has caused some 
consternation in the regulated community."6 Although the term has 
appeared in other laws, neither Congress nor the agencies have given it 
much attention."? Nonetheless, the meaning of the term is not an 
interpretive grab-bag. Congress said an actor or practice is abusive if it: 
( 1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to 
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or 
service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of-
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of 
the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or 
service; 
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product 
or service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered 
person to act in the interests of the consumer."s 
For now, the CFPB has only repeated the statutory definition and made 
clear that it interprets "abusive" as a distinct term, even though its meaning 
may overlap with the definitions of "unfair" and "deceptive."''9 The 
definition, however, gives some clues as to how UDAAP may add further 
protections. Most important, the term has a subjective dimension insofar as 
114. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL 
VERSION 2.0, UDAAP 5 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_ 
cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-V2.pdf. The CFPB further suggests it will hew close to 
the FTC's definitions of unfair and deceptive insofar as it draws on numerous examples taken 
from FTC enforcement actions. !d. at UDAAP 2-8. 
115. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (lg83), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm ("[T]he Commission will find deception if 
there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting 
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."). 
116. See, e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins, 'Chilling Effect' of 'Abusive' in Dodd-Frank, 175 AM. BANKER 
I (2010). 
117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16g2(e) ("It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive 
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain 
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to 
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses."); id. 
§ 163g(l) (2) (B) ("The Bureau, by regulation or order, shall prohibit acts or practices in 
connection with ... refinancing of mortgage loans that the Bureau finds to be associated with 
abusive lending practices, or that are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower."). 
1!8. 12 u.s.c. § 5531 (d) (2012). 
11g. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL 
VERSION 2.0, supra note 114, at UDAAP g. 
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it looks to the (likely, "reasonable") consumer's perception and 
understanding. In the end, the meaning of the term will depend on how the 
CFPB interprets and enforces the provision, and likely how state attorneys 
general do the same. 
One place this new term may allow SAGs to better protect consumers is 
to curtail "steering," whereby lenders or other credit providers direct 
customers in the first instance to products that may not provide them with 
the best terms for which they qualify. Steering is effective in part because 
many consumers who sit down with a lender trust that the person on the 
other side of the table will tell them about the best available deal. The 
amendments to TILA in Title XIV ban financial incentives that promote this 
practice among home mortgage lenders.' 20 But the practice happens in 
other areas, as well. In particular, SAGs might use this new power to prevent 
steering practices among private student lenders. This practice occurs now 
when private lenders steer students to take larger loans than they really 
need. A SAG might also argue that steering occurs when a private lender 
fails to tell a student about the availability of more advantageous federal 
students loans for which the student possibly qualifies.' 21 
To understand the significance of Congress's decision to extend 
enforcement power of the new UDAAP ban to states, we need to understand 
the scope of SAG powers to stop unfair and deceptive practices under state 
law. Although state UDAP laws are a key protection for consumers in the 
financial marketplace, they also have limitations. In many states the power of 
SAGs to enforce their state's consumer protection act is limited because of 
weak substantive prohibitions.' 22 A strong statute includes a ban on unfair 
and deceptive practices, like the federal UDAP ban. 123 Some states, however, 
prohibit only specific acts, requiring the legislature to enumerate new harms 
on a case-by-case basis. Colorado124 and Indiana, 125 for example, do not 
prohibit "deception," but only certain specifically enumerated deceptive 
acts. 
Another substantive weakness in many state UDAP laws concerns the 
scope of application: which individuals or entities SAGs can reach. Some 
states include exemptions for certain industries. The Virginia Consumer 
Protection Act, for example, exempts nearly all of the credit industry. 126 
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1639b(c). 
121. See Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act's 
'Abusive' Standard, 14). CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 126-27 (2011 ). 
122. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATES: A 5o-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), 
available at http:/ /www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/reporr_so_states.pdf. 
123. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
124. COLO.REV.STAT§6-1-105(1) (2009). 
125. IND. CODE§ 24-5-<J.5-3 (1993 & Supp. 1997). 
126. VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1-1 99 (D) (2007). 
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Michigan provides the most glaring example. Although on paper the state 
has otherwise robust protections for consumers,I•7 the Michigan Supreme 
Court has vitiated the act by interpreting it to exempt any industry subject to 
state regulation or licensing-an exemption that swallows the rule. 12s 
Moreover, some states such as Nevada'•9 and North Dakota'3° follow the 
common law and require proof of knowledge or intent, which can also stand 
as an obstacle to relief. And finally, some state UDAP laws provide weak 
remedies. Although nearly all states allow for civil penalties, in some states 
like Rhode Island,'3' Pennsylvania,'3" and Missouri,'33 a low cap on initial 
violations compromises effective deterrence.'34 
For the many states with significant gaps in state law, Congress's 
decision to give SAGs the power to enforce the new UDAAP ban is highly 
significant. In some states, SAGs can now reach industries previously exempt 
under state law either by express provision or judicial interpretation.'35 SAGs 
in many states now also have flexibility where the state-UDAP only applies to 
127. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 445.901-22 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005). 
128. SeeLiss v. Lewiston-Richards, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. 2007); Smith v. Globe Life 
Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 28 (Mich. 1999). 
129. NEV. REV. STAT.§ 589.0915 (2000). 
130. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 51-15-02 (2007). 
131. R.I. GEN. LAws§ 6-13.1-8 (2011) (limiting civil penalties to subsequent violations of an 
injunction). 
132. PA. CONS. STAT. § 201-S(b) (Supp. 2005) (limiting civil penalties to $1,000 per 
violation for initial violations). 
133. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.100(6) (2ooo) (limiting civil penalties to $1,000 per violation 
for initial violations). 
134. As suggested earlier, supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text, the power of SAGs 
under state UDAP laws has also been limited because of the threat that federal regulators will 
preempt application of these laws against federally chartered depositories. Most immediately, 
these preemption claims applied to laws that directly regulated these institutions, such as state 
predatory lending laws. Both the OCC and the OTS issued rules stating that their preemptive 
directives did not extend to generally applicable state laws, such as those governing contracts, 
commercial transactions, and real property, insofar as such laws only had an incidental effect 
on the federal depository. See Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,972 (Sept. 30, 
1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 56o.2(c)) (OTS); Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7·4007(c), 7·4oo8(e)) (OCC). However, 
statements made by the OCC and the OTS have left some confusion. See CAROLYN L. CARTER & 
JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES §§ 2-5·3·2-·3·3 (8th ed. 
201 2). Further, in some cases these claims to preemption also applied to state UDAP Jaws when 
courts determined that the plaintiff was using the state's general prohibition on unfair and 
deceptive acts or practices to accomplish what a specific law was otherwise preempted from 
achieving. See id. (listing cites). Although Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act does not expressly 
address state UDAP Jaws, as a whole it suggests that SAGs can still enforce these laws against 
federal depositories, that the scope of preemption has narrowed, and that case-by-case 
preemption will apply. See Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of 
the RoblrSign Scanda~ 64 ME. L. REv. 17, 32-43 (2011) (arguing, similarly, that SAGs can still 
enforce these laws against federal depositories, that the scope of preemption has narrowed, and 
that case-by-case preemption applies); supra notes 88-go and accompanying text. 
135. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
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enumerated acts or practices, or in states that lack either of the unfair or 
deceptive prohibitions.•36 Moreover, for all states this power is extended to 
cover abusive acts or practices.'37 The range of civil penalties may also be 
much greater under UDAAP, which range from a maximum of $5ooo per 
violation per day, up to $25,000 if the violation is reckless, and $1 million if 
the same is knowing.'3s And lastly, the availability of the federal UDAAP to 
SAGs may bolster the case against preemption of state UDAP laws. At a 
minimum it allows the state to enforce any of the CFPB's regulations under 
the federal UDAAP against federal depositories. Among the substantive 
provisions that Congress empowered SAGs to enforce, the UDAAP ban is the 
most important and for many states has the potential to fill critical gaps.'39 
2. Other Federal Consumer Financial Protection Laws 
Despite receiving much less attention than the meaning of the new 
"abusive" prohibition, another critical and contested interpretive issue 
determining the scope of SAG enforcement powers is whether these powers 
extend beyond UDAAP and accompanying regulations. Do states have the 
power to enforce the whole of "federal consumer financial law," including 
the eighteen federal statutes that fall under this term (referred to as the 
"enumerated consumer laws") as defined by Title X, and any regulations 
under those statutes?•4o Both a narrow and a broad reading of Title X 
acknowledge, as the statute requires, that-whatever their enforcement 
powers-SAGs are limited to enforcing the CFPB's regulations against 
136. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 116-19 and accompanying text. 
138. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c) (2012). 
139· In addition to UDMP regulations, SAGs can also enforce other rules under Title X 
provisions that the CFPB might one day promulgate. See, e.g., id. § 5532(a) (granting the CFPB 
the power to prescribe rules to "ensure that the features of any consumer financial 
product or service . . . are fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to consumers"); id. 
§ 5533(a) (granting the CFPB the power to ensure consumer access to information regarding a 
consumer financial product or service); id. § 5518(b) (granting the CFPB the power to limit or 
even ban mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements). This latter power could be especially 
important, given recent attention to such agreements and their consequences for consumer 
protection. See, e.g., Maria Aspan, Issuers Moving Away from Arbitration, 174 AM. BANKER 16 Uuly 
23, 2009); Zachary Gima et al., Forced Arbitration: Unfair and Everywhere, Pus. CITIZEN (Sept. 14, 
2009), http:/ /www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf; Robert]. Hobbs & Rick 
Jurgens, Forced Arbitration: Consumers Need Permanent Relief, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. (Apr., 
201 o), http:/ /www.nclc.org/images/pdf/ arbitration/report-forced-arbitration. pdf; Firm Agrees 
to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES Uuly 19, 2009), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/07/2o/business/2ocredit.html?_r=o. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded 
that state laws banning mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are preempted by federal 
law, AUied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995), if the CFPB 
exercises its discretionary power to limit or prohibit these agreements, these rules would give 
SAGs considerable enforcement powers that they do not currently possess. 
140. 12U.S.C.§5481(12),(q) (2012). 
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federal depositories.'4' The narrow reading of the statute, however, says that 
SAGs can only enforce UDAAP and any other substantive provisions created 
by Title X. The broad reading says that SAGs can enforce UDAAP, but can 
also enforce the whole of federal consumer financial protection law: all the 
pre-existing statutes, and the regulations under them. 
Even if the narrow reading is correct, the Dodd-Frank Act still gives 
states extraordinary power to enforce federal law. Nonetheless, the 
implications of which reading prevails are highly significant, given the scope 
of laws at stake.'4" Although few stakeholders have weighed in on this issue, 
the ones that have expressed an opinion mirror the range of interpretive 
options. The National Consumer Law Center'43 and the National 
Association of Attorneys General'44 have both issued statements that favor 
the broad reading of the statute, while many of the large law firms (who 
represent the regulated community) '45 have favored the narrow reading. 
The CFPB has been silent on the matter, except to say that the section 1042 
notice requirement when a state enforces a federal law under that section 
"does not apply to actions brought under the enumerated consumer 
laws .... "•46 If the agency does interpret the statute on this point, whether it 
gets the final word will depend on whether the courts determine that the 
statute is ambiguous. Although Congress could have written with more 
clarity, for the reasons that follow I believe the broad reading aligns more 
closely with the statutory text. 
The interpretive problem arises under Title X, section 1042, which 
creates dual-enforcement powers. Congress allowed state attorneys general 
to "bring a civil action ... to enforce provisions of this title or regulations 
141. /d.§ 5552(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
142· /d.§ 5481(12). 
143· Impressive Ne:w Reach of State AG Enforcement Authority, 29 NCLC REPORTS: DECEPTIVE 
PRACTICES & WARRANTIES ED. jan.-Feb. 2011, at 18 ("The Dodd-Frank Act appears to provide 
attorneys general ... the authority to enforce most federal consumer credit legislation-even 
when the other legislation does not grant the attorneys general this authority. This result is 
consistent with the intent of the Dodd-Frank Act to 'put more cops on the beat' by empowering 
state attorneys general to police the market."). 
144. NAT'L Ass'N OF AIT'YS GEN., WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: 
SUMMARY FOR ATTORNEYS GENERAL 6 (2010), available at http:/ /www.naag.org/assets/files/ 
pdf/pubs/wall-street-reform-UB.pdf (noting that 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (a)( 1) gives SAGs 
concurrent-enforcement powers and concluding that "[t]his language suggests that Attorneys 
General will be able to step into the shoes of the Bureau in enforcing Federal consumer 
financial protection law, with the same investigatory tools and remedies that are available to the 
Bureau"). 
145· See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Federal Preemption User 
Guide, MORRISON & FOERSTER 13 (July, 2010), http:/ /www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/lmages/ 
100723UserGuide.pdf ("[T]he CFPB defers to the Enumerated Consumer Laws where those 
laws themselves state when the state attorneys general or state regulators may take enforcement 
action under those laws."). 
146. State Official Notification Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,112, 39,113 (June 29, 2012). 
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issued under this title."•47 The issue concerns the meaning of "provisions of 
this title" and likewise the meaning of "regulations issued under this title."'48 
Without question these two phrases encompass Title X's new UDAAP 
prohibition and any regulations the CFPB promulgates under it, as well as a 
few other provisions in Title X where Congress created new regulatory 
powers and placed them in the hands of the CFPB.•49 
Nonetheless, in at least two ways Title X reaches into the pre-existing 
structure of federal consumer financial protection. First, in Title X Congress 
transferred administrative responsibility for most existing consumer 
financial protection laws to the CFPB.•so Second, and more important, in 
Title X Congress announced two prohibitions that encompass the federal, 
substantive norms that protect consumers in the financial marketplace. In a 
brief section captioned "Prohibited Acts," Congress stated: 
It shall be unlawful for any covered person or service provider-
(A} to offer or provide to a consumer any financial product or 
service not in conformity with Federal consumer financial law, 
or otherwise commit any act or omission in violation of a 
Federal consumer financial law; or 
(B) to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or 
practice.•s• 
On the basis of this first prohibition, Congress empowered SAGs to 
enforce the whole of federal consumer financial law and any regulations 
under those laws, with the only exception being the limitation on enforcing 
only regulations against federal depositories.•s• The first prohibition does 
not render any acts unlawful that did not already have that status. Congress 
created a provision in Title X that expressly prohibited acts already unlawful 
under the laws and regulations subsumed within the definition of "federal 
consumer financial law." This prohibition is one of the "provisions of this 
title" that Title X empowers SAGs to enforce.•s3 
Arguments in support of the narrow reading are not convincing. One 
possible argument looks to the definition of "federal consumer financial 
law" and concludes that the statute distinguishes between "provisions of this 
147. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1). 
148. /d.§ 5552(a)(1). 
149. See supra note 139· 
150. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5581(a)(1). 
151. !d.§ 5536(a)(1). 
152. The second prohibition is arguably included wiihin the first, insofar as Congress 
defined "federal consumer financial law" to include "the provisions of this title," of which 
UDAAP is clearly a provision. /d. § 5481 ( 14). 
153· !d. § 5552 (a) (I). 
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title" and "the enumerated consumer laws."•54 Accordingly, this distinction 
supports the claim that "provisions of this title"-the same language used 
later in Title X to describe the scope of SAG enforcement powers'5~oes 
not include the eighteen federal laws which the statute calls the 
"enumerated consumer laws," and any rules under those laws.'56 This 
argument would have more weight if the only way Congress extended the 
reach of Title X to the already-existing structure of federal consumer 
financial protection was to transfer administrative responsibility for these 
pre-ex1stmg statutes. However, Congress announced two express 
prohibitions in Title X, the first of which is a prohibition on violating federal 
consumer financial law, the second of which is the UDMP ban. If the 
second prohibition is a "provision[] of this title" for purposes of section 
1042, then so is the first prohibition.'&? 
Another argument focuses on the "rule of construction" in section 1042 
that follows the grant of enforcement power to states. This rule states: "No 
provision of this title shall be construed as modifying, limiting, or 
superseding the operation of any provision of an enumerated consumer law 
that relates to the authority of a State attorney general or State regulator to 
enforce such Federal law."•&8 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, a few federal 
statutes gave states limited concurrent-enforcement powers.'59 If the broad 
reading prevails, the argument goes, then the rule of construction is 
nonsensical because this interpretation only expands the powers of states to 
enforce these other statutes. Under the narrow reading, however, this rule 
functions to make clear that states are not limited to enforcing UDAAP, but 
retain these other previous grants of concurrent-enforcement powers. 
The broad view, however, makes sense of this rule of construction when 
read against the restriction in the previous paragraph limiting SAGs to 
enforcing only 'regulations and not statutory provisions against federal 
depositories.•6o The rule of construction makes clear that in those past or 
future instances where the enumerated consumer laws allow SAGs to 
enforce provisions of those laws against federally chartered depositories, that 
power is not superseded by the restriction in Title X on states prohibiting 
the enforcement of the statutory provisions-namely, UDAAP and the 
enumerated consumer laws-against such depositories. For example, the 
rule of construction would make clear that the 1983 amendment to RESPA 
giving state attorneys general power to enforce the statute's anti-kickback 
154. ld. § 1002(14). 
155. Id. § 1042(a)(1). 
156. ld. § 1002(12), (14). 
157. See id. § 1042(a)(1). 
158. Id. § 1042(a)(3). 
159. See supra notes 9<>-97 and accompanying text. 
160. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1042(a)(2)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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provision against all financial institutions is not overruled.'6' 
Although the text of Title X alone supports the broad reading, the 
legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Congress never directly 
discussed the issue, but it did arise in a Senate debate over competing 
amendments.' 62 Senator Bob Corker (Tennessee) sought to amend Title X 
to preclude any role for state attorneys general, whereas Senator Tom 
Carper (Delaware) introduced an amendment that would preserve this 
power. Speeches on the floor all suggested that the Carper amendment 
would allow SAGs power to enforce the enumerated consumer laws and the 
rules passed under these laws.•6s 
If the broad reading is correct, this interpretation endows states with 
considerable power to enforce federal law. To sense the breadth of this 
power, consider three areas where state attorneys general can enforce 
federal rules, including against national banks and federal savings 
associations.'64 One area is federal disclosure requirements in the provision 
of consumer credit. The rules fall under Regulation Z, implementing 
TILA.•6s These wide-ranging rules "promote the informed use of consumer 
credit by requiring disclosure about its terms and cost[s]," and also by 
regulating the substantive terms of credit.•66 Included are rules governing 
credit cards, as to their terms, costs, and means of solicitation,' 57 and special 
rules governing the marketing of credit cards to college students.'6B 
Regulation Z also covers disclosure as to home mortgages•69 and private 
161. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
162. See 156 CONG. REC. S3866-g9 (2010). 
163. See, e.g., id. at S3871 ("[Sen. Corker:) But what has happened as a result of lhe bill is 
lhe fact that ... we now have State AGs-they are going to enforce ... rules lhat emanate from 
lhese Federal statutes."). 
164. On lhe broad reading of lhe statute, SAGs can enforce any violation of "Federal 
consumer financial law." As defined, lhis body of law includes regulations under Title X or lhe 
enumerated consumer laws only insofar as they are "prescribed by the Bureau." Dodd-Frank 
Act§ 1002(14). Although the CFPB has rulemaking power as to most of lhe rules it enforces, 
Title X creates some exceptions. The CFPB can enforce several FTC rules, for example. See 
Identification of Enforceable Rules and Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,569, 43,570 n.12 (July 21, 
2011) (listing alllhe rules that the CFPB can enforce, as required by§ 1063(i)); CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL VERSION 2.0 (2012), 
availoJJle at http:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov/guidance/supervision/manual. Presumably the 
states cannot enforce lhese rules because the CFPB lacks rulemaking power. 
165. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.59 (2013). 
166. /d.§226.1(b). 
167. Id. §§ 226.5-.16. 
168. /d.§§ 226.51-.59· 
169. /d. §§ 226.17-.24. 
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educationallending,'7° which have been issues of increasing interest to state 
attorneys general.'7' 
Another area where states have new powers under federal law concerns 
the use of debit cards and gift cards, under Regulation E, which implements 
the Electronic Fund Transfers Act.'72 Among other functions, these rules 
require notice to the consumer when an ATM withdrawal incurs a fee'73 and 
also the terms under which gift cards expire.'74 Finally, Title X gives SAGs 
new federal powers to stop discriminatory lending. Regulation B'75 falls 
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and creates a broad prohibition on 
discrimination in the offering of credit on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, or marital status,'76 as well as source of income in some 
cases.'77 
3· New Substantive Limits on Mortgage Terms 
In addition to empowering state attorneys general to enforce the new 
UDAAP ban, as well as most federal statutes that protect consumers in the 
financial marketplace, the Dodd-Frank Act also gives states power to enforce 
several new substantive limits on mortgage originators and servicers as 
amendments to TILA.'78 These new limits address several of the predatory 
lending practices that helped fuel the economic crisis and include: a 
prohibition on steering;'79 requiring creditors to make a good faith 
determination that a borrower has the ability to repay the loan;' 80 a 
prohibition on certain prepayment penalties;' 8 ' requirement of escrow 
accounts for certain loans;'8• creation of standards to assure appraisal 
independence;' 83 requirement for prompt crediting of home loan 
payments;' 84 requirement for prompt notice of payoff amounts of a home 
170. See, e.g., Kelly Field, Attorneys General Take Aim at Far-Profit Colleges' Institutional Loan 
Programs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (March 20, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Attomeys-
General-Take-Aim-at/ 131254/. 
171. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.46-.48. 
172. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.20. 
173· ld. § 205.16. 
174· ld. § 205.20(e). 
175. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-.17. 
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a)(1) (2oo6). 
177. Id. § 16g1(a)(2). 
178. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1422, 124 Stat. 1376,2157 (2010). 
179· ld. § 1403. 
180. ld. § 1411(a)(2). 
181. Jd. § 1414(a). 
182. Jd. § 1461 (a). 
183. Id. § 1472(a). 
184. ld. § 1464(a). 
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loan upon request;' 8s and creation of heightened appraisal requirements in 
the case of certain higher-risk mortgages.' 86 In each instance, Congress gave 
SAGs power to enforce both the statutory provision and any rules the CFPB 
might promulgate under these provisions.' 87 Moreover, this grant includes 
authority to enforce these provisions against federally chartered 
depositories.'ss 
B. PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL POWERS 
The states' ability to exercise these substantive powers to protect 
consumers of financial products will depend in significant part on the scope 
of the procedural and remedial powers that accompany them. Although the 
Act gives some guidance, for the most part it is silent on these powers. 
Rather, we must discern them against the backdrop of constitutional, 
statutory, and common law powers that shape the offices of state attorneys 
general. Using this approach, I will examine the power to investigate, forum 
selection and multi-state litigation, the use of outside counsel, and various 
remedies. 
1. Investigation 
Authority to enforce federal law will often be useless without powers to 
investigate potential wrongdoing.'sg All SAG offices have a system for 
receiving consumer complaints, which often serves as the starting point for 
later enforcement actions.'9° These systems, and especially the more 
sophisticated online programs, allow law enforcement to discern trends over 
time or quickly respond as needed. The decision to bring an enforcement 
action, however, will often require more evidence than provided in 
consumer complaints and so the ability to enforce rests on the ability to 
investigate. 
States clearly have power to investigate state law violations. State UDAP 
laws, for example, generally give SAGs power to investigate and engage in 
185. Id. § 1464(b). 
186. /d.§ 1471. 
187. See id. § 1422 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 164o(e) to read, "An action to enforce a 
violation of [the new statutory provisions) may also be brought by the appropriate State 
attorney general"). 
188. /d.§ 1042(a)(3). 
18g. See STATE AITORNEYS GENERAL POWER AND RESPONSlliiUTIES 234-35 (Emily Myers & 
Lynne Ross eds., 2d ed. 2007) ("Thorough investigation is the key to the successful prosecution 
of any consumer case. Accordingly, one of the most effective statutory tools available to most 
Attorneys General is the authority to serve subpoenas and obtain discovery prior to the filing of 
any complaint. This enables enforcement authorities to determine whether further action is 
necessary to enforce the consumer protection laws."); Prentiss Cox, Regulatory Perspectives & 
Initiatives: State Attorneys General Case Selection and Investigation, in 1 2TH ANNUAL CONSUMER 
FINANCIAI.. SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE 83 (2007). 
190. Cox, supra note 18g, at 86. 
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pre-complaint discovery, often through issuance of a civil investigative 
demand ("CID"). 19 1 Other state laws provide general authority for a SAG to 
investigate possible violations of state law. 192 CID or other investigative 
authority, however, does not necessarily include the power to pursue pre-
complaint investigations based on possible violations of federal law. 
Therefore, many attorneys general will face concerns about the extent of 
their power to investigate potential federal violations of Title X. 
One possibility is that SAGs share in the grant of investigative power 
given the CFPB under Title X. 193 This grant includes broad authority to issue 
CIDs and seek judicial enforcement. 194 The statute, however, does not 
support this interpretation. Title X expressly grants this power to "the 
Bureau," without mentioning that state attorneys general share in it. 195 
Moreover, the authorization for states to enforce federal law in section 1042 
does not mention the power to investigate, even though it does mention 
remedial powers. 196 In other instances when Congress meant to give states 
investigative powers, it made its intentions clear. 197 Nothing in Title X, 
however, prohibits SAGs from making investigative demands on the basis of 
an independent state power to investigate violations of federal law. 
Although the availability of the demand power varies among the states, 
this authority can arise from several sources. A few states give their attorney 
general broad statutory authority to make investigative demands whenever 
necessary to protect the public interest. The California Attorney General, for 
example, has authority to "make investigations and prosecute actions 
concerning ... [a]ll matters relating to the business activities and subjects 
under the jurisdiction of the department."tgS This authority includes power 
to demand documents, other materials, or testimony pertinent to an 
investigation, prior to filing a civil or criminal complaint. 199 Presumably this 
broad language would cover investigations pursuant to enforcement actions 
under Title X. 
Although less tested, arguably state attorneys general in most states also 
have authority to issue CIDs under state common law. With a few exceptions, 
the states have widely recognized that the powers of this office are 
191. CARTER&SHELDON, supra note 134, § 13·3· 
192. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.§ 8.31, subdiv. 2 (2013). 
193· See WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECfiON Acr: SUMMARY FOR ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL, supra note 144, at 6-8. 
194. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 1052(c)(1), (e)(1), 124 Stat. 1376,2019,2024 (2010). 
195. !d. § 1052(c)(1 ); see also Rules Relating to Investigations, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,168, 45,171 
Quly 28, 2011) (describing authority under§ 1080.4). 
196. Dodd-Frank Act § I 042 (a) (I). 
197. See, e.g., S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of2oo8, 12 U.S.C. § 5114 (Supp. II 2008). 
198. CAL. Gov'TCODE§ lll8o (West 2005). 
199· /d.§lll81. 
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determined not only by state statutory and constitutional law, but also by the 
common law and the historic powers attached to the office.ooo Most 
authorities suggest that SAGs have common law power to issue civil 
investigative demands.oo•For example, in People v. Crawford the Illinois 
Supreme Court considered a challenge to the power of the state attorney 
general to issue civil subpoenas in an antitrust investigation .. o• The 
defendants argued that such power was inconsistent with the state 
constitution and the organic statute creating the office.0°3 The court denied 
the challenge, holding in part "that the powers and duties of the Attorney 
General include not only those powers conferred upon him by statute, but 
also those powers and duties inherent in the office as it existed at common 
law," including the power to investigate.2°4 
Finally, an attorney general may also have powers to engage in pre-
complaint discovery on the basis of an express state provision granting 
power to investigate violations of federal law. Few states have taken this 
route, but given the sweeping changes brought by the Dodd-Frank Act, 
more states may want to consider this approach. For example, the State of 
Washington gives its attorney general power to issue a CID and petition for 
judicial enforcement of the demand prior to instituting a civil action 
whenever relevant to an investigation of a possible violation of the state 
UDAP law "or federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters that 
the attorney general is authorized to enforce."•os The Washington statute 
models a possible legislative fix to the problem. 
200. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 189, at 33-38 (summarizing common law 
authority and collecting cases). Perhaps the most oft-cited case for this authority is Florida ex ret. 
Sheuin v. Exxon Corp. 526 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he attorneys general of our 
states have enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not 
exhaustively defined by either constitution or statute but include all those exercised at common 
law. There is and has been no doubt that the legislature may deprive the attorney general of 
specific powers; but in the absence of such legislative action, he typically may exercise all such 
authority as the public interest requires." (citations omitted)). A few states have rejected any 
common law powers for the office of attorney general. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Barnes, 8o4 A.2d 
152, 169 (Conn. 2002) ("[W]e conclude that the office of the attorney general possesses only 
that common-Jaw authority previously held by the state's attorneys that the legislature has 
transferred to that office by way of legislation."); In re Estate of Sharp, 217 N.W.2d 258, 262 
(Wis. 1974). 
201. See Widman, supra note 4, at 195 n.156. But see NAT'L AsS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., THE 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 55 ( 1971) (finding no express power in the common law to issue 
subpoenas); STATE AITORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 189, at 44 (commenting on 
aforementioned work and concluding, "[m]odern courts, however, have analyzed challenges to 
an Attorney General's authority, not by cataloguing ancient prerogatives, but by focusing on the 
principles that define the scope of the Attorney General's duty to represent the public 
interest"). 
202. People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 291 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. 1972). 
203. Id. at 656. 
204. /d. 
205. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 19.86.110(1) (West 2013). 
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Any state power to investigate violations of federal consumer financial 
protection law by national banks, however, is tempered by a provision in 
Title X that codifies the Supreme Court's holding in Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Ass'n.2°6 Cuomo involved the scope of a provision in the National Bank Act 
which prohibits states from exercising "visitorial powers" upon national 
banks.2°7 The OCC interpreted this provision to block states from bringing 
any enforcement actions against national banks, including under otherwise 
non-preempted general state laws governing property, taxation, zoning, and 
tort law. •oS 
On the one hand, Cuomo was a victory for the authority of state 
attorneys general, striking down the agency's regulation as far exceeding the 
scope of "visitorial powers" in the statute and affirming the power of states to 
enforce their general laws against national banks_oog On the other hand, the 
Court made clear that the National Bank Act's prohibition on the exercise 
of visitorial powers reaches some uses of pre-complaint discovery by a state 
attorney general. In Cuomo the New York attorney general issued 
investigative demands against several national banks before filing civil 
charges.210 The attorney general said the demands were '"in lieu of other 
action," namely the issuance of a subpoena under state law granting such 
authority. 211 The Court suggested that if a state attorney general was filing a 
civil suit, the demand would be legitimate because the enforcement of state 
law is separate from the exercise of visitorial powers. However, the Court 
concluded an attorney general could not compel discovery against a 
national bank absent a direct connection to a law enforcement action," 12 but 
could only do so through the judicial process.213 Cuomo would seem to 
prevent attorneys general from engaging in pre-complaint discovery outside 
the judicial process against national banks as an effort to determine whether 
or not to file a law enforcement action. 
2. Forum Selection and Multi-State Litigation 
Title X authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action "in any 
district court of the United States in that State or in State court that is 
206. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1047, 124 Stat. 1376, 2018 (2010) (codifying Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519 
(2oog)). 
207. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2oo6). 
208. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 6g Fed. Reg. 
1904 Uan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7• 34). 
209. Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 535-36. 
210. /d.at522-23. 
21 1. !d. at 536. 
212. !d. 
213. /d.at53o-31. 
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located in that State and that has jurisdiction over the defendant."••4 Unlike 
most other provisions granting states power to enforce federal law, Title X 
allows a state attorney general to file in either state or federal court. 21 s State 
attorneys general often prefer to litigate in state court, if only for the 
perceived advantage of being the chief legal officer in the sovereign's courts. 
On account of the removal power, however, these actions may often move to 
federal court.••6 
Nonetheless, although many of the federal procedural rules follow state 
law, the ability to bring an action in federal court may have a few advantages. 
In a narrow set of circumstances, a federal forum may give an attorney 
general power to reach persons otherwise beyond the reach of state courts. 
Even among states whose long-arm statutes reach as far as the Constitution 
permits,''? the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment still 
requires minimal contacts with the particular state.•• 8 In most cases, the 
personal jurisdiction of a federal district court extends only as far as the 
same power granted to state courts in which the federal district lies.••9 
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize a court's 
jurisdiction over persons beyond the bounds of state law where a federal 
statute creates nationwide service of process;•o Congress did not give federal 
214. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
J042(a)(1), 124Stat. 1376,2012 (2010). 
215. !d.; see Lemos, supra note 4, at 708 ("Most state-enforcement provisions specify that 
state attorneys general must sue in federal court, thereby departing from the default 
presumption that state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of action." 
(citations omitted)); id. at 708-10 nn.41-54. 
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2oo6) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 
(2oo6) (removal power); Dodd-Frank Act§ 1042(b) (2) (CFPB power to intervene and remove 
an action to federal court). 
217. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAGfiCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1068 n.12 (3d ed. 2002). 
218. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) ("[D]ue process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
219. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) (I) (A). 
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C); see also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4 § 1068.1 
("Rule 4(k)(1)(D) [now 4(k)(1)(C)) of the 1993 amendments now makes clear that when 
Congress authorizes personal jurisdiction over a defendant service may be made in accordance 
with the federal statute .... The power of Congress to authorize nationwide service of process in 
actions arising under federal law is beyond question, as a line of venerable Supreme Court cases 
have stated." (footnotes omitted)). Common federal statutes that carry a nationwide service of 
process provision include the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa, 78aa (2oo6) 
(securities fraud); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2oo6) (antitrust actions); Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2) (2oo6) (ERISA actions); and Federal 
Debt Collection Procedures Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3004(b) (2006). 
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courts this power under Title X.••• The Rules, however, do recognize a 
district court's power over a foreign defendant who falls beyond the reach of 
any state's courts and the Constitution does not otherwise preclude personal 
jurisdiction.••• In this case, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applies and only requires that the defendant have minimal contacts with the 
United States as a whole, rather than a particular state as the Fourteenth 
Amendment demands. ••3 
In most cases, a defendant will fall within the personal jurisdiction of 
some state and therefore the federal long-arm provision will not apply. 
These situations will leave SAGs with the same limitations as to personal 
jurisdiction they face under state law, since Title X permits them to file only 
in a federal district court "in that State."••4 Nonetheless against some 
defendants, especially foreign internet operators beyond the reach of a 
state's long-arm statute, the availability of a federal forum may allow a case to 
go forward. ••s 
In addition to possibly extending the scope of personal jurisdiction, a 
Title X action in federal court will often give SAGs increased discovery 
powers to reach persons out of state. Beginning with its decision in 
International Shoe, the Supreme Court opened the door for states to empower 
their courts to reach out-of-state defendants.••6 The revolution in personal 
jurisdiction, however, never advanced to expand a state court's discovery 
powers in a civil action.••7 In many states still today, inter-state discovery is 
slow, cumbersome, and often fails to deliver. The process can involve several 
221. State attorneys general must file "in any district court of the United States in that State 
or in State court that is located in that State." Dodd-Frank Act§ 1042 (a)( 1). CFPB must file "in 
a United States district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a state in a district in 
which the defendant is located or resides or is doing business." Id. § 1054([). 
222. FED.R.CIV.P.4(k)(2). 
223. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1993 Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(k)(2), 28 U.S.C. Appendix (2006) (recognizing Fifth Amendment limitation "that any 
defendant have affiliating contacts with the United States"). The courts of appeal have upheld 
this application of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. 
Com. De Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (" [T]he due process analysis ... 
contemplates a defendant's contacts with the entire United States .... "); Holland Am. Line 
Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 462 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); Mwani v. bin Laden, 
417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer 
Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934,946 (7th Cir. 2ooo) (same). 
2 24. Dodd-Frank Act § 1042 (a) ( 1). 
225. Plaintiffs have primarily used Rule 4(k)(2) to reach foreign internet operators to raise 
intellectual property claims. See, e.g., Synthes, 563 F.3d 1285 at 1293-g6; Graduate Mgmt. 
Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 596-6oo (E.D. Va. 2003); Sunshine Distrib. v. 
Sports Authority Mich., 157 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787-go (E.D. Mich. 2001 ); see also Mark B. 
Kravitz, National Contacts and the Internet: The Application of FRCP 4(k)(2) to Cyberspace, 7 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. LJ. 55, 56 (1998). 
226. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
227. See Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennuyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REv. 37, 
74-75 (1989). 
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months of seeking court approval in both the trial state and the discovery 
state, and in some jurisdictions having to hire local counsel in the discovery 
state.••8 Under Rule 45, however, a federal plaintiff can issue a subpoena in 
the name of the court in the discovery state without ever going before a 
court.229 If necessary, the plaintiff can petition the federal court in whose 
name the subpoena was issued to enforce the order.•Bo Although the gradual 
adoption by states of the Uniform Deposition and Discovery Act has reduced 
the burden of state discovery, nearly half the states have not yet adopted the 
Act and the federal process remains simpler. 2B1 
The forum provision in section 1042 (a) ( 1) also has implications for 
bringing multi-state actions to enforce federal consumer financial law. •B• 
While subject to criticism, these actions have been a powerful tool in the 
hands of state attorneys general, starting in the 1g8os and rapidly 
accelerating in the 1ggos with the tobacco litigation.•BB In multi-state 
litigation, attorneys general pool their resources to file similar complaints in 
state court or one complaint as joint-plaintiffs in federal court.•34 The 
language in Title X granting concurrent-enforcement powers precludes the 
latter form of coordination, since state attorneys general can only bring a 
civil action in state court or "in any district court of the United States in that 
State."•Bs Unless a state can satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirement in a 
state or federal court located within its borders, SAGs cannot enforce federal 
consumer protection laws that involve violations in other states. Although 
some observers have argued to the contrary,as6 this restriction does not close 
the door to coordination. The states could file similar complaints in state 
court, as happened in 2000 when twenty-seven states filed separate state 
228. See id. at 115, 12o-23. 
229. FED. R. Crv. P. 45(a) (3); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 45(a) (3) advisory committee's note to 
1991 Amendment ("In authorizing attorneys to issue subpoenas from distant courts, the 
amended rule effectively authorizes service of a subpoena anywhere in the United States by an 
attorney representing any party."). 
230. See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(e). 
2 31 . See INTERSrATE DEP6smONS AND DISCOVERY Acr ( 2007), available at http:/ /www.uniform 
laws.org/ Actaspx?title=lnterstate%2oDepositions%2oand%2oDiscovery%2oAct 
232. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1042(a)(I), Pub. L. 
No. 11·203, 124 Stat. 2012 (2010). 
233. See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as 
National Policymakers, 56 REv. POLS. 525, 531-38 (1994) (describing the increasingly political 
role of state attorneys general); Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State 
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1998, 2003-o8 (2001); Timothy 
Meyer, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys Genera~ Regulatory Litigation, and the New 
Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 899-904 (2007). 
234. See Lyt~ch, supra note 233, at 2003-oB; Kevin]. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick WaU 
Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34, 35-36 (2001). 
235. Dodd-FrankAct§ 1042(a)(I) (emphasis added). 
236. Lemos, supra note 4, at 763 (concluding that section 1042(a) (1) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act "effectively precludes states from pooling their resources in multistate actions"). 
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claims accusing Publishers Clearing House of deception in their sweepstakes 
promotion.•37 Alternatively, the states could file separate actions in federal 
court, with the likelihood that the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation 
would consolidate the cases in one district court. •38 Although the states 
would lose the opportunity to select a perceived favorable forum, they would 
retain the efficiencies of coordinated litigation. 
3· Outside Counsel 
Title X also raises the question of whether state attorneys general can 
hire outside counsel on a contingency-fee basis to enforce federal law. The 
employment of plaintiffs' attorneys under the supervision of state attorneys 
general has a long history, but entered the spotlight with the tobacco 
litigation of the mid-1ggos. Supporters of the practice argue that hiring 
outside counsel provides necessary resources for attorneys general who may 
lack funding and expertise to bring critical enforcement actions on their 
own, while critics argue that these arrangements skirt the state legislature's 
appropriations oversight, lack transparency, often fall in the hands of 
political donors, and may lead to over-enforcement.•39 
Title X is silent on whether SAGs can employ outside counsel, and 
thereby implicitly permits this arrangement, assuming state law otherwise 
allows. In other instances, when Congress intended to limit how a state 
attorney general enforces federal law it has expressly prohibited the hiring 
of private counsel on a contingency-fee basis.24° Moreover, although a 
237· See Publishers Clearing House Strikes Deceptive-Practices Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2ooo), 
available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2ooo/ o8/ 2 3/ us/publishers-clearing-house-strikes-deceptive-
practices-accord.html. In a federal action, the cases may be subject to removal by the defendant or 
the CFPB. 
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2oo6) (multidistrict litigation). 
239. See David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of 
Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 315 (2001); Donald G. 
Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 
49 B.C. L. REv. 913, 964-69 (2008); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate 
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 658-75 (2012); 
Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Plaintiffs' Bar's Covert Effort to Expand State 
Attorney General Federal Enforcement Power, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER,July 10, 
2009, at 4· For an overview of how some states are responding to this issue see Amanda 
Bronstad, AGs Review Hiring of Outside Counsel, LAW.COM (May 15, 2007), http:/ /www.law.com/ 
jsp/articleJsp?id=1179146390047· In early 2012, the House of Representatives held a hearing 
on the use of contingency fees in the state enforcement of federal law, which included 
testimony from Professor Amy Widman (Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Illinois 
University), Hon. William McCollum, Jr. (former Florida attorney general), and James R. 
Copland (Director and Senior Fellow, Center for Legal Policy, Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research). Contingent Fees and Conflicts of Interest in State AG Enforcement of Federal Law: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012) 
[hereinafter Contingent Fees Hearing]. 
240. As early as 1976, with passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act 
granting concurrent-enforcement powers to SAGs, Congress was careful to define "state 
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presidential executive order bans hiring of outside counsel by contingency 
fee, the order applies only to "individuals that provide such services to or on 
behalf of the United States. "•4• 
4· Remedies 
Title X creates a broad range of remedies, all of which are available to 
state attorneys general enforcing the statute.•4• The statute begins with an 
umbrella provision that empowers courts "to grant any appropriate legal or 
equitable relief with respect to a violation of Federal consumer financial 
law."•43 Recall that this last phrase refers to any substantive provisions in 
Title X, including the general UDAAP ban, as well as any of the eighteen 
federal consumer financial protection laws ("enumerated consumer laws") 
and accompanying regulations.•44 The statute then provides a non-exclusive 
list of available remedies, including "rescission or reformation of contracts; 
refund of moneys or return of real property; restitution; disgorgement or 
compensation for ur~ust enrichment; payment of damages or other 
monetary relief; publication notification regarding the violation, including 
the costs of notification" and limits on the offender's activities or 
functions.•4s In addition, the statute creates a three-tiered civil penalty 
scheme that allows a court to assign penalties as steep as $1 million for each 
day the violation continues.•46 The only remedy the statute precludes is 
punitive damages.•47 Finally, a state attorney general can recover all costs 
associated with bringing the case if the state prevails. •48 
Congress's decision to place these remedial powers in the hands of the 
chief legal officers of the fifty states is significant for at least two reasons. 
First, these powers allow state attorneys general to seek broad relief on 
attorney general" so as to exclude "any person employed or retained on a contingency fee 
based on a percentage of the monetary relief awarded." Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435. § 301, go Stat 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
15g(1)(A) (2006)). 
241. Exec. Order No. 13,433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,441 (May 16, 2007) (emphasis added). Even 
critics recognize that Tide X permits state attorneys general to hire outside counsel on a 
contingency fee basis, and instead call on Congress to codify Executive Order 13,433 to apply 
to state attorneys general exercising their powers under the Dodd-Frank Act. See Contingent Fees 
Hearing, supra note 239, at 49 (testimony of James R. Copland, Director and Senior Fellow, 
Center for Legal Policy, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research). 
242. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1042(a)(1), Pub. L. 
No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 2012 (2010) (authorizing state attorneys general to bring civil actions 
and empowering them "to secure remedies under provisions of this tide or remedies otherwise 
provided under other law"); id. § 1055 (listing available remedies). 
243· !d.§ 1055(a)(1). 
244· !d.§ 1002(14). 
245· !d.§ I055(a) (2). 
246. /d.§ 1055(c). 
247· !d.§ 1055(a)(3). 
248. !d.§ i055(b). 
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behalf of aggrieved consumers. In effect, Title X codifies a gloss on the 
common law doctrine of parens patriae. •49 This doctrine gives state attorneys 
general standing•so to represent "a set of interests that the State has in the 
well-being of its populace."•s• The Supreme Court has described these rights 
as "quasi-sovereign" interests, which include a state's interest in the health, 
comfort, economic well-being, and welfare of the state's citizens.•s• 
Examples of quasi-sovereign interests include a state's right to address public 
nuisances, including nuisances that have direct negative effects on private 
commerce and public health,•53 and a state's right to preserve a well-
functioning marketplace and the economic interests of its citizens, 
threatened by another state or private enterprise.•s4 As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has interpreted the common law doctrine, absent an express statutory 
allowance for standing, a state has standing to bring suit under federal law 
when at least two conditions prevail: the state has a quasi-sovereign interest, 
apart from the interests of particular private parties, and a "sufficiently 
substantial segment of its population" has suffered the harm.•ss Although 
courts have varied, the majority position is that under the parens patriae 
doctrine a state attorney general can seek not only injunctive relief, but also 
damages on behalf of individual citizens as long as the i~ury to the state is 
not merely the injury to the state's citizens.•s6 
249. For background on the common law doctrine of parens patriae, see generally STATE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 189, at 102-o4; Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, 
State Attarney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. 
REv. 1859 (2ooo);jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL L. REV. 1847 (2ooo);jim 
Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. BJ. 684 
(1998). Although the common law doctrine has evolved over centuries, the most important 
modern case interpreting the bounds of the doctrine is Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico 
exrel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
250. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 6oo. 
251. /d.at6o2. 
252. /d. at 6o1, 6os-o6. 
2 53· See, e.g., id. at 6o3-o4 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 ( 1901) ("Missouri 
sought to enjoin [Illinois] from discharging sewage [that polluted] the Mississippi River in 
Missouri")). 
254. See, e.g., id. at 605 (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) 
(Pennsylvania sought to protect the right "of its residents [to maintain] access to natural gas 
produced in West Virginia.")). 
255· /d. at 607. 
256. See generally Ryan & Sampen, supra note 249, at 686-88 (listing key cases). In Maryland 
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), the Court recognized standing on the grounds of parens 
patriae for eight states that sued Louisiana because of a tax it imposed on natural gas exports 
from the state. The Court concluded "A State is not permitted to enter a controversy as a 
nominal party in order to forward the claims of individual citizens. But it may act as the 
representative of its citizens in original actions where the injury alleged affects the general 
population of a State in a substantial way." /d. at 737· The Court looked to the impact the tax 
would have on "a great many citizens" and the likelihood that individual consumers would not 
sue given the small amounts at stake for each person. /d. at 739· In cases where individual 
citizens do not have a private right of action, states will be unable to recover on their behalf. See, 
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Remedial powers under Title X are in some ways more generous than 
the common law doctrine it codifies?s7 While the common law doctrine 
requires a state assert a more general interest than the harms to individual 
citizens, Title X expressly gives states power to recover on behalf of its 
citizens without establishing a quasi-sovereign interest.oss Moreover, unlike 
the common law doctrine, states can recover for citizens regardless of 
whether the underlying consumer financial protection law contains a private 
right of action. 
Despite the seemingly clear language in section 1055, some early 
commentators have argued that state attorneys general lack the power to 
recover on behalf of their citizens.osg This argument stems from language 
originally included in Title X, as introduced in the House, which said that 
"[a]ny State attorney general may bring a civil action in the name of such 
State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State . .. to 
secure monetary or equitable relief for violation of any provisions of this title 
or regulations issued thereunder."•6o The final language omitted the 
reference to the common law doctrine.o6 • Although Congress has sometimes 
included the omitted language to make clear that states can seek relief on 
e.g., Satsky v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 7 F. 3d 1464, 1469 (1oth Cir. 1993) (concluding that 
a state suing parens patriae could not assert claims for private damages under CERCLA because 
the statute did not provide for such damages). 
257· Congress has codified the states' power to recover on behalf of their citizens in other 
more limited contexts. See, e.g., Children Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a) ( 1) 
(2oo6); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (2oo6) (antitrust); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
U.S.C. § 13a-2(1) (2012) (trading of commodity futures); Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o6(f) (2oo6); Credit Repair 
Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679h(c) ( 1) (2oo6); Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(3) (2oo6) (access to reproductive health services); Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 61o3(a) (2oo6); Telephone Disclosure 
and Dispute Resolution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5712(a) (2oo6) (pay-per-call services). 
258. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1042(a)(1), Pub. L. 
No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 2012 (2010); id. § 1055(a). 
259· See, e.g., Thomas I. Elkind et al., Consumer Financial Protection Act: Preemption Qy.estiuns, FOLEY 
& LARDNER LLP 26 (Aug. 26, 2010), http:/ /www.foley.com/files/Event/ad781735·<=s85-475b-8ea(}-
o821 79b6669o/Presentation/EventAttachment/b9o 1 o4d(}-Qeb6-4b83-a381-oeacbdde3e56/CFP A_ 
Presentaiton.pdf ("There is no provision permitting state attorneys general to bring class action type 
cases against any covered entity on behalf of state citizens."); Mare Than just Financial Reform: Ana~sis 
and Obseroatiuns on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, JONES DAY WHITE 
PAPER 87 (Aug. 2010), http:/ /wwwJonesday.com/files/Publication/d7d71bc5-6ee4-4144-9aoJ>. 
91 b6d95Cb2ag/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 24bcecbc-dc 1 f-4863-9204-93fdcbgbcc8e/ 
Financial%2oReform%2oDodd-Frank%2oWhite%2oPaper.pdf ("The Act does not however, include 
the authorization that was part of the original House bill [section 1041] to sue as parens patriae, which 
could have enabled state authorities to sue for damages incurred by their citizens."). 
260. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2oog, H.R. 4173. 111 th 
Cong. § 4402(a) (1) (emphasis added) (as introduced in the House on Dec. 2, 2oog). 
261. Dodd-Frank Act§ 1042(a)(1) ("[State attorneys general] may bring a civil action in 
the name of such State ... to enforce provisions of this title or regulations issued under this 
title, and to secure remedies under provisions of this title or remedies othenvise provided 
under other law."). 
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behalf of their citizens, on many occasions the legislature has codified the 
common law doctrine without any explicit reference to the doctrine.•6• 
Moreover, the list of remedies available-which includes "restitution," 
"disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment," and "payment of 
damages or other monetary relief'--confirms that states can seek remedies 
for their citizens.•63 
Congress's decision to place these remedial powers in the hands of state 
attorneys general is also significant for a second reason: these concurrent 
powers will often extend well beyond the powers otherwise available under 
state laws. Most important, the remedial powers available to state attorneys 
general under Title X in some cases significantly exceed the same powers 
available under the state UDAP law. While state law often permits courts to 
issue i~unctions and provides for restitution, few state UDAP statutes 
include an express, broad allowance to recover for "damages or other 
monetary relief," as permitted under Title X.264 As one consumer advocacy 
organization has pointed out, this provision "allows for recovery of 
consequential and other damages exceeding the amount paid for the 
product or service."•6s Moreover, other remedies available such as "rescission 
or reformation of contracts"•66 are often not available under state law."67 
Lastly, the civil penalties available under federal law will often far exceed the 
penalties courts could impose under a state UDAP statute. Rhode Island, for 
example, does not provide for any civil penalty, and other jurisdictions, such 
as Pennsylvania and Missouri, only allow for penalties up to $1 ,ooo per 
262. Statutes that include an express reference to the common law doctrine include 
Children Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 65o4(a)(1) (2oo6); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15c(a)(1) (2oo6) (antitrust); Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7706(£)(1) (2oo6); Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 248(c) (3)(A) (2oo6); and Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2oo6). Several statutes, however, grant the same power without 
invoking the name of the common law doctrine. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 
13a-2 (1) (2012) (trading of commodity futures); Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1679h(c)(1) (2006); Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 164o(a), (e) 
(2oo6 & Supp. III 2009); and Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
5712(a) (2oo6) (pay-per-call services). 
263. Dodd-Frank Act § 1055 (a) (2). Proponents of the view that Title X does not codify the 
parens patriae doctrine also argue that the absence of any express reference to the doctrine has 
special meaning given that a later provision in Title X does invoke the common law doctrine. 
See id. §§ 1097(1), (2) (granting state attorneys general the power to bring a civil action "as 
parens patriae" for "unfair or deceptive acts or practices regarding mortgage loans"). Section 
1097, however, is merely a conforming amendment to a bill that was originally passed into law 
in 2009. See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, sec. 430, § 626(b)(1), 
123 Stat. 678. 
264. Seesupranote 143, at 18. 
265. /d. at 18. 
266. Dodd-Frank Act§ 1055(a)(2) (A). 
267. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 134, § 12.7.2 ("Relatively few state UDAP statutes 
explicitly provide rescission or voiding the transaction as a remedy."). 
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violation.•68 These low penalties may amount to a slap on the wrist that does 
little to deter violations of the law.•69 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
On paper the Dodd-Frank Act empowers state attorneys general to play 
a vital role in reforming the American system of consumer financial 
protection. The gap between paper and practice, however, may be wide. 
Closing the gap will depend in significant part on implementation, 
including putting in place systems to support partnering between the states 
and especially with the CFPB. Before turning to these measures, I briefly 
mention a few inherent limits on states as co-enforcers and review several 
implementation steps already underway. 
Several factors will likely shape the degree to which individual SAGs 
exercise these new powers, including resources, ideology, independence, 
and overlap. Most state attorney general offices have very limited resources 
and, while attention to consumer protection issues has greatly increased in 
recent decades, most offices will have very few dedicated attorneys in this 
area.27° The time required to understand Title X and federal law alone may 
prohibit action. Moreover, ideology may often shape the readiness of state 
attorneys general to bring consumer financial protection actions in states 
where the balance favors industry over consumer protection or political 
alliances discourage litigation against the financial services industry.27' A 
desire to maintain independence may also mitigate the use of these new 
powers. The separate sovereign identity of states, along with the pressures 
that shape an office that in most states is elected, may discourage bringing 
actions under federal law or partnering with a federal agency. Finally, where 
state laws are adequate, attorneys general may opt to stay in state court 
where they enjoy the perceived advantage of being the chief legal officer of 
the sovereign. 
At the same time, other factors may encourage states to exercise these 
new powers. In their empirical study examining the actual use of 
concurrent-enforcement authority under sixteen federal consumer 
protection laws, Widman and Cox found that states infrequently exercised 
268. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
26g. At the same time, the often more generous federal monetary remedies have the 
potential to skew decision-making, in particular among states that require their consumer 
protection units to self-fund through litigation or allow such recoveries to augment budget 
appropriations. See Lemos, supra note 4, at 734-35. 
270. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 18g, at 238 ("Staffing of consumer protection 
divisions in the offices of the Attorney General varies widely and can range from one attorney 
with additional responsibilities in other areas to well over a dozen attorneys involved exclusively 
in consumer protection enforcement."). 
271. See Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General 
Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 PoL. RES. Q. 6og, 612-17 (2006). 
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these powers and never used about half the statutes.•?• Nonetheless they 
noted that state attorneys general more often invoked federal statutes that 
addressed areas where historically the office has been active, such as 
consumer financial protection.•73 Moreover, as already mentioned, the 
federal UDAAP and other enumerated laws will sometimes offer stronger 
protections than state law.•74 And depending on the leadership at the CFPB 
and its willingness to cooperate with states, attorneys general may find that 
the CFPB offers invaluable federal resources that states lack. •75 
At this point in time, the states and the CFPB have already taken some 
steps toward implementation. Shortly after Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") issued a 
summary of the Act and its implications for the states.•76 Moreover, several 
SAGs and the CFPB have begun building partnerships. In April 2011, the 
CFPB and a group of state attorneys general now known as the Dodd-Frank 
Working Groupm issued a joint statement outlining broad principles that 
will guide this partnership.•78 The NAAG has a standing Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Working Group.•79 The CFPB has begun to participate in 
some of the NAAG regular staff-level conference calls on consumer 
protection issues. Several attorneys general have signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding ("MOU") with the CFPB to permit information-sharing, 
while maintaining confidentiality.•Bo Moreover, the California State Assembly 
even held a lengthy hearing about the implications of the Dodd-Frank Act 
at the state level, including the work of the state attorney general.•8• Across 
the states, however, most attorneys general have done very little to 
272. See Widman & Cox, sufrra note 4· at 81-82. 
273. Id. at 83-84 (explaining that several of the federal statutes SAGs do employ "concern 
consumer credit and finance, another area of traditional focus by state attorneys general"). 
274. See sufrra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. 
275. Seediscussion infrap. 149· 
2 76. See sufrra note 144· 
277. This group was originally called the "Presidential Initiative Working Group," and was 
started by North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper during his term as President of the 
NAAG. Dennis Cuevas, New Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Is open for Business, NAAG, 
http:/ /www.naag.org/new-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-is-open-for-business.php (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
278. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protect. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
and National Association of Attorneys General Presidential Initiative Working Group Release 
Joint Statement of Principles (Apr. 1 1, 2011), available at http:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov I 
pressreleases/ consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-national-association-of-attorneys-
general-presidential-initiative-working-group-releasejoint-statement-of-principles/. 
279. NAAG Standing Committees, NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http:/ /www.naag.org/ 
naag_standing_committees.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
280. See infra note 302. 
281. See The Dodd-Frank WaU Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Initial Reactions, Initial 
Steps, and Likely Impacts: Hearing Before the Assemb. Comm. on Banking & Fin. and the S. Comm. on 
Banking & Fin. Insts., 2011-12 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2011 ), available at http:/ /abnk.assembly. 
ca.gov I 20 110versighthearings (compact disc of hearings on file with author). 
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implement their new powers. Although still early, the states have partnered 
with the CFPB to bring only a few enforcement actions under Title X.•8• 
Developing a clear implementation plan is critical if states are going to 
help restore an adequate level of consumer financial protection, while 
avoiding over-enforcement and limiting nonuniformity in federal law. 
Toward this end, state attorneys general should focus on at least three 
implementation priorities: assessment, authorization, and cooperation. I 
briefly mention the first two priorities and then focus on the final and most 
important task of building partnerships among the states and with the CFPB. 
A. ASSESSMENT 
In the past, some concurrent-enforcement powers have likely remained 
unused in part because the states lacked a clear understanding of the federal 
tools available to them.•83 The states should begin by conducting an 
inventory of their new powers under Title X. Although the scope of these 
powers is uniform across the states, the impact on each state will depend on 
the scope of state law and where gaps may lie. In some cases states will have 
new substantive powers. For example, as mentioned earlier the availability of 
UDAAP under Title X is an extraordinary new enforcement tool for the 
Michigan attorney general, given a state supreme court ruling that vitiates 
the state UDAP ban.•84 In addition, states will often have additional 
procedural and remedial powers. 
B. AUTHORIZATION 
In addition to assessing the scope of available powers, state attorneys 
general should ensure they have the necessary state authorization to exercise 
282. In June 2012, the CFPB assisted Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway and twenty 
other SAGs in a multi-state investigation of GIBill.com, a website that directed veterans and 
service members to for-profit colleges by strongly implying that the federal government 
sponsored the site. See Carter Dougherty, 'GI Bill' Site Called Misleading Closed in Settlement, 
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012, 12:58 PM), http:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-<>6-27/state-
closes-college-lead-generator-aimed-at-military.html. The states finally settled with the parent 
company under an agreement that shut down the website. ld.; QuinnStreet, Inc., Assurance of 
Voluntary Compliance, SEC.GOV (June 26, 2012), available at http:/ /www.sec.gov/ Archives/ 
edgar/data/1117297/ooo119312512284713/d372925dexw1.htm (on file with the author). 
The first joint enforcement action between several states and the CFPB was in December 2012 
and targeted a debt-relief service provider that required fees in advance of settling debt, in 
violation of state and federal law. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protect. Bureau, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and State Partners Obtain Refunds for Consumers Charged Illegal 
Debt-Relief Fees (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov /pressreleases/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-state-partners-obtain-refunds-for-consumers-charged-
illegal-debt-relief-fees/. 
283. See Widman & Cox, supra note 4, at 84 (noting that "knowledge about the various 
examined statutes among state attorneys' general offices" may partially explain the non-use of 
some powers). 
284. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
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these powers. They should consider in advance whether they are empowered 
as a matter of state law to conduct investigations and bring enforcement 
actions under Title X. In many cases, for political and strategic reasons, the 
state attorneys general will choose not to question their powers in public, as 
raising the matter may invite scrutiny. Merely exercising the powers may 
accrue the necessary legitimacy. Nonetheless, in some states the attorney 
general may need to consider securing authorization from the state 
legislature. 
Many states will have broad statutory or constitutional grants of power 
to the office of the state attorney general which may authorize the exercise 
of concurrent-enforcement powers. Moreover, most states recognize robust 
common law powers associated with the office.•85 Nonetheless, a few states 
have expressly rejected common law powers for the state attorney general 
and have narrowly defined the authority of the office.•86 In these states, the 
attorney general may want to consider seeking express authorization from 
the state legislature. One of these states, Connecticut, passed such a law in 
2011 giving the state attorney general express power to exercise concurrent 
powers under the Dodd-Frank Act. •87 
The power to enforce, however, may have no effect absent the power to 
investigate. As examined earlier, a few states such as California have given 
their state attorney general broad investigative powers by legislation. In most 
states, however, legislative authorization in the area of consumer protection 
is limited to investigations brought under the state UDAP.•88 Although an 
attorney general may rely on common law powers where a state recognizes 
them, some state attorneys general may want to seek express authorization. 
The State of Washington provides perhaps the best example, granting power 
to investigate in connection with any exercise of power granted under 
federallaw.>sg 
C. COOPERATION 
Most important, states in conversation with the CFPB need to build the 
infrastructure for partnerships. Fostering cooperation is important to 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, provide predictability for 
industry, and prevent over-enforcement."9° Moreover, enforcement is not 
285. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
287. Act of july 1, 2011, 2011 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 11-119 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 3-129e) ("The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction to enforce any provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, that a state attorney general is authorized by said act to 
enforce and to seek any relief that a state attorney general is authorized by said act to seek."). 
288. See supra notes 191-g2 and accompanying text. 
28g. See supra note 205. 
290. See Lemos, supra note 4• at 703. 
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the only tool to ensure compliance. The CFPB and other federal regulators 
have supervisory powers over many entities.•9• Supervision can often be a far 
more efficient means of compliance than enforcement, with the latter 
serving as a back-up strategy where supervision has failed or against the 
more egregious offenders. And yet without strong state-federal 
partnerships, state enforcement may cut short the supervisory process. These 
partnerships may be fragile or elusive, given competing political incentives 
and ideological differences. And by design, Congress empowered states to 
play an important role even when they lack a strong federal partner. •9• But 
the system will work best when these partnerships flourish, in both formal 
and informal ways. Cooperation should extend to at least three areas: 
information systems, investigations and enforcement actions, and 
rulemaking. 
1. Information Systems 
Systems that collect and process complaints play a critical role in the 
work of state attorneys general, especially in the area of consumer 
protection.•93 They provide a direct connection to consumers, facilitating 
informed decision-making about what to investigate and when to bring an 
enforcement action. Although the sophistication of these systems is widely 
divergent, both SAGs and The CFPB have them.•94 These systems allow 
officials to collect, organize, distribute, analyze, and respond to information 
they receive. Each function presents opportunities to for states to partner 
with federal or other state actors. 
Consumers of financial products and services have multiple channels to 
register their complaints, including with the state attorney general, the 
Better Business Bureau, and a new online system by the CFPB. Effectively 
organizing and sharing information collected through these systems 
promises to increase not only the quantity of information, but also its 
quality. Information about emerging regional or even national threats, for 
291. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
292. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 56-58. 
293· See Cox, supra note 189, at 86. 
294- STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 189, at 120, 238-39; Consumer Response: A 
Snapshot of Complaints Received, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU Qune 19, 2012), http:/ /files. 
consumerfinance.gov /f/ 20 1206_cfpb_shapshot_complaints-received.pdf; Kate Davidson, How 
Does the CFPB Complaint System Worlt?, AM. BANKER (Nov. 30, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www. 
americanbanker.com/issues/ 176_231 I cfpb-complaint-system-1044485-1.html; OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTEGflON BUREAU'S CONSUMER 
RESPONSE UNIT (2012), available at http:/ /www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/Evaluation_CFPB_ 
CRU_September2012.pdf. Currently the CFPB receives complaints at http:/ /www.consumer 
finance.gov/complaint related to mortgages, credit cards, bank accounts or services, vehicle or 
consumer loans, student loans, debt collections, money transfers, and credit reporting. 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Sept. 
20, 2013). 
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example, may affect the type of state response or the state's judgment about 
the best actor to respond to the threat. 
Title X addresses the issue of information-sharing by the CFPB with the 
states, in some instances requiring it and in others making it discretionary. 
The law requires the federal agency to share its complaints with the states.•95 
In addition, the statute requires the agency to share examination reports 
with the states,•96 and gives it discretion to share "any other report or other 
confidential supervisory information,"•97 although the agency has made 
clear it will not routinely share such information.•98 To qualify for 
information-sharing, the statute requires that states ensure confidentiality.299 
The agency, a few states, and even one cil:y3°0 have already taken steps to 
share information. The CFPB has promulgated regulations governing the 
disclosure and use of confidential information shared with the states.3°' 
Moreover, the agency has signed MOUs with several states pledging to 
secure confidential information.3°2 The CFPB uses Consumer Sentinel 
Network as an qnline platform for sharing confidential complaint 
information with law enforcement officials at the state, local, and federal 
295· In the section dealing with the collection and tracking of complaints in Title X, 
Congress said that "State agencies may receive appropriate complaints." Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act§ 1013(b)(3)(B), Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 
2012 (2010) (emphasis added). The same sub-section, however, later states: "To facilitate 
preparation of the reports [for Congress]. supervision and enforcement activities, and 
monitoring of the market for consumer financial products and services, the Bureau shall share 
consumer complaint information with ... State agencies." /d. § 1013(b)(3) (D) (emphasis 
added). The CFPB's regulations require the agency to share complaints with the states, 12 
C.F.R. § I070.43(a) (2) (2012), and draft examination reports, 12 C.F.R. § J070.43(a) (1). 
296. Dodd-Frank Act§ 1022(c)(6)(C)(i); 12 C.F.R. § 1070·43(a)(1). 
297· Dodd-FrankAct§ 1022(c)(6)(C)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § J070·43(b)(I). 
298. CFPB Bulletin I2-oi, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http:/ /files.consumerfinance.gov /f/ 2012/ o 1 /GC_bulletin_12-o 1.pdf. (" [T] he Bureau will not 
routinely share confidential supervisory information with agencies that are not engaged in 
supervision. Except where required by law, the Bureau's policy is to share confidential 
supervisory information with law enforcement agencies, including State Attorneys General, only 
in very limited circumstances and upon review of all the relevant facts and considerations."). 
299· Dodd-Frank Act§ 1013(b) (3) (B) (iii). 
300. Press Release, City of Chi., Office of the Mayor, Mayor Emanuel Announces New 
Reforms to Protect Chicago Families from Financial Fraud (Dec. 5, 2012), available at 
http:/ /www.cityofchicago.org/ content/ dam/ city I depts/ mayor /Press% 2oRoom/Press% 20Rel 
eases/2012/December/ 12.5.12FinanciaiFraud.pdf. 
301. Disclosure of Records and Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,372, 45.394 (July 28, 2011) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1 070.4<>-4 7). 
302. See CFPB, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BE1WEEN CFPB AND [STATE] (Mar. 2, 
2012) (on file with the author); Caner Dougherty, Republican State AGs Resisting Cooperation with 
CFPB, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news/20J2-og-
19/ republican-state-ags-resisting-cooperation-with-consumer-bureau.html. 
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levels.3o3 Consumer Sentinel is a secure, online database maintained by the 
ITC that provides access to complaints shared not only with the ITC and 
the CFPB, but multiple other federal, state, and private organizations such as 
the Better Business Bureau.3°4 Nearly all SAG offices have access to the 
network,3°5 and eight states share their complaints on Sentinel.3°6 
In addition to measures already enacted or underway, state attorney 
general offices need to take at least two further steps to bolster information-
sharing. First, states need to do a thorough review of state public-
information laws and ensure they can fulfill the confidentiality requirements 
established by the CFPB.3°7 Some states have robust freedom-of-information 
laws that could raise obstacles, particularly if the state receives the 
information outside the context of a particular investigation.3°8 Arguably the 
information should be safe because the federal government only shares 
under the condition of confidentiality,3°9 but a state court interpreting a law 
that has historically given citizens broad access to information may conclude 
otherwise. As a last measure, a state might consider amending its public-
information laws to create an express exemption for information received 
from federal agencies for law-enforcement purposes. Although state FOIA 
laws generally include an exemption for "law enforcement purposes," the 
legislature would want to define the term to include pre-investigation 
activities.3' 0 Moreover, a state worried about creating too large an exemption 
might draw it narrowly to cover only complaints used by a state agency 
exercising its powers under Title X. 
303. Sartaj Alag, Consumer Response Now Sharing Complaints with FTC Consumer Sentinel, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU BLOG (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
blog/consumer-response-now-sharing-cornplaints-with-ftc-consumer-sentinel. 
304. Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http:/ /www.ftc.gov /sentinel/ 
reports.shtrnl (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
305. Sentinel Members Lis~ FED. TRADE CoMM'N, https:/ /register.consumersentinel.gov/ Agency/ 
AgencyLookup.aspx#State (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
306. Consumer Sentinel Network Data Contributors, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http:/ /www.ftc.gov/ 
sentinel/datacontributors.shtrnl (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
307. For a general overview of state public information laws, see JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE§ 27.1-23 (3d ed. 2011). 
308. See, e.g., FLA. CONST., Art. I, § 24 (access to public records and meetings); FLA. STAT. 
§ 119.01-19;GA.CODEANN.§ 132-1 to 132.10. 
309. 12 C.F.R. § 1070·43(b)(1)(v) (2012) (specifying that all state requests for information 
must include "[a] commitment that the [state] agency will maintain the requested confidential 
information in a manner that conforms to the standards that apply to federal agencies for the 
protection of the confidentiality of personally identifiable information and for data security and 
integrity"). 
310. See, e.g., Haynie v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560, 567 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 2, 2000) ("[R]ecords created before or during the stop cannot be withheld under 
[the state FOIA law] because the prospect of enforcement proceedings were not concrete and 
definite when the records were prepared."), overruled by Haynie v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 
112 Cai.Rptr. So (Cal. 2011). 
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Second, more state attorneys general should consider sharing their 
consumer complaints through Consumer Sentinel, as long as they can 
ensure confidentiality of consumers' personal information and any 
proprietary information as well. SAGs are closer to consumers than a distant 
federal agency, which can shape both the type and quantity of complaints 
they receive. Although scams are sometimes purely local, they often repeat 
or connect with events on a regional or national level. Many SAG offices lack 
the technical capacity to share complaints, and limited resources may prove 
prohibitive. Nonetheless, broader sharing of information will both allow 
SAGs to better carry out their consumer protection mission-for example, 
with real-time data of consumer fraud at their borders-and allow the CFPB 
and other federal agencies charged with protecting consumers to play a 
more informed, supportive role. 
In addition to sharing information, the states and the CFPB can also 
partner to analyze and respond to consumer-complaint information in a 
manner that is more efficient and effective than would be possible through 
individual efforts alone. The federal agency's size and resources allow it to 
play an important supportive role, examining consumer complaints and 
providing sophisticated analysis. Moreover, in some cases consumers will 
contact the CFPB on a matter either better handled at the state level, or over 
which the agency lacks authority.3 11 And in other cases the federal agency 
may be better positioned to respond to the complaint, and states should 
have protocols for making referrals as well. 
By design, the states can play both a cooperative and competitive role 
under the Dodd-Frank dual-enforcement regime. Establishing robust 
information-sharing systems that protect confidential information should be 
a priority, especially at this moment. Every step by the CFPB has the 
potential to define the new agency well into the future. Putting these systems 
in place now, when the agency has expressly repeated its commitment to 
partnering with the states, will increase the likelihood that they will endure 
even if a future administration is less consumer-friendly. 
2. Investigation and Enforcement Actions 
The state-federal partnership should extend not only to building 
coordinated information systems, but also to coordinating investigations and 
enforcement actions. These relationships will have limits. The partners to 
this relationship are ultimately separate sovereigns who will make their own 
decisions regardless of the infrastructure for coordination that is in place. 
Ideology will pay some role, depending on both the particular state attorney 
general and leadership at the CFPB.312 Resource limits, especially by the 
states, will shape decision-making. And at a fundamental level the state and 
311. See supra notes 7g-So and accompanying text. 
312. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
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federal partners are very different kinds of actors, a difference which has 
implications for interactions between the two as well.3's 
Nonetheless, coordinating actions within a concurrent-enforcement 
regime is not without precedent. Antitrust law is one example.314 Although 
the coordination that emerged in this context has limits and is defined by 
the different federal actors and substantive law, it suggests the possibility for 
complementarity between sometimes very different actors. State-federal 
coordination for investigation and enforcement has at least five benefits. 
The first benefit is the scope of enforcement authority. If the broad 
reading of section 1042 is correct,3'5 then with only one exception-the 
enforcement of the UDAAP ban against federally chartered depositoriess' 6-
state attorneys general have the widest authority of any actor to enforce 
federal consumer financial law. Against depositories, Title X limits the CFPB 
to enforcing federal consumer financial law only as to institutions with assets 
above a defined threshold.3'7 Enforcement against depositories below the 
threshold lies in the hands of the prudential regulator.s' 8 In a situation 
where the prudential regulator refuses to act, the CFPB may be able to assist 
the states in bringing actions.3'9 
A second benefit is jurisdiction. States are limited in their ability to 
reach across state lines, either to investigate or to bring enforcement 
actions.320 The CFPB has power to investigate, including issuing civil 
investigative demands that potentially reach both targets and non-targets 
313. See Lemos, supra note 4, at 717-36. 
314. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2oo6). For analysis of state enforcement of federal antitrust law, 
see generally Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE LJ. 
673 (2003); Patricia A. Conners, Cu1Trnt Trends and Issues in State Antitrust Enforcement, 16 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 37 (2003); Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust 
Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1004 (2001); MichaelS. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust 
Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005); Stephen Paul Mahinka & 
Kathleen M. Sanzo, Multistate Antitrust and Consumer Protection Investigations: Practical Concerns, 63 
ANTITRUST LJ. 213 (1994); STATE ATIORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 189, at 271--91; Richard A. 
Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys Genera~ in COMPETITION 
LAWS IN CONFUCf: ANTITRUST jURISDICI'ION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252 (Richard A. Epstein 
& Michael S. Greve eds., 2004); Roger Slade, Federal Obstruction of State Antitrust Enforcement: The 
Second Circuit Finds No Place for State Participation in the Fast World of Mergers, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 
591 (1986). 
315. See supra notes 140-77 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra notes 141 and accompanying text. 
317. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 
§§ 1026(d)(1), 1026(a), 124 Stat. 2012 (2010). 
318. /d. 
319. The limit on the CFPB's enforcement power based on the asset threshold does not 
seem to apply to the agency's power to investigate. See id. § 1052(c)(1) (giving power to issued 
civil investigative demands "[w]henever the Bureau has reason to believe that any person may be 
in possession [of material] relevant to a violation" (emphasis added)). 
320. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text. 
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that states are unable to reach.321 States focused on a particular target or 
area of consumer protection might consider negotiating standing requests 
with the CFPB for such demand material.3•• The same advantage pertains to 
enforcement actions. For example, the CFPB may have an important role to 
play in the enforcement of federal consumer financial law as it applies to 
internet payday lenders who ally with Indian tribes that enjoy tribal 
sovereign immunity and are therefore exempt from state consumer 
protection laws-a growing problem that has left state attorneys general with 
few options.3•3 
A third benefit is the availability of expertise and other human 
resources. For example, building a strong case may require technical 
assistance that SAG offices lack, such as economists who can perform 
regression analysis or forensic accountants who can identify and trace 
fraudulent activities. A fourth benefit is knowledge of targets. States may 
have more local knowledge, whereas the CFPB may have a better 
understanding of practices that reach across a region or the nation. The 
final benefit is remedies. State attorneys general have a long history of 
recovering money for individual consumers whereas federal actors have 
often lacked this focus.3•4 Together, these factors may favor several 
arrangements: the state or the federal partner acting alone, one taking the 
lead with the other playing a supporting role, or the bringing of a joint 
investigation and even a joint enforcement action. 
To facilitate these partnerships, the states and the CFPB should agree to 
a Protocol for Coordination. This protocol should borrow from a 1998 
agreement in the field of antitrust between the state attorneys general, the 
U.S. Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade CommissionYs This 
agreement outlined a framework for how the states and the federal agencies 
would conduct joint or coordinated investigations and enforcement actions. 
The first two sections of the antitrust protocol covered confidential 
information, which in the consumer financial protection context is already 
covered by regulation3•6 and the MOU that the CFPB has been signing with 
321. Dodd-Frank Act§ 1052(c)(1). 
322. See 12 C.F.R. § 1070·43(d) (2012). 
323. See generaUy Nathalie Martin &Joshua Schwartz, The AUiance Between Payday Lenders and 
Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 
( 2012); Carter Dougherty, Payday Lenders and Indians Evading Laws Draw Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG 
(June 5· 2012), available at http:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news/ 201 2-o6-o4/payday-lenders-and-
indian-tribes-evading-laws-draw-scrutiny-1-.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Payday Lenders join 
With Indian Tribes, WAll. ST.]. (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http:/ /online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB 1 ooo 1424052 7 48703 7169045761343041551 o632o.html. 
324. See supra notes 24g-56 and accompanying text. 
3 2 5. See Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations between the Federal Enforcement Agencies 
and State Attorneys General (I998), in 1 WILLIAM A. HANCOCK, MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 
COMPLIANCE§ 15.3 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
326. See supra notes 295-99· 
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individual state·s.3•7 The remaining three sections, however, provide a model 
for a similar agreement in the area of consumer financial protection. This 
agreement would cover coordination of strategic planning, such as assigning 
areas of responsibility and identifying theories of the case; coordination of 
document production; and coordination of interviewing and perhaps 
deposing witnesses. The agreement would also cover collaboration in the 
settlement process and the release of information to the public.3•8 The 
NAAG's Consumer Financial Protection Working Group should take the 
lead in negotiating a similar protocol with the CFPB, and perhaps other 
federal agencies charged with enforcing consumer financial protection 
law.329 
Lastly, state attorneys general should consult with the CFPB to test new 
theories interpreting the law, especially the UDAAP ban. Uniform 
application of federal consumer protection law and local experimentation 
both carry costs and benefits and neither goal should subsume the other. 
Ensuring open lines of communication between the states and the CFPB, 
while respecting the states' independent powers, is critical to preserve a 
productive tension between predictability and innovation. Although the 
provision requiring states to give notice to the CFPB before bringing an 
action under federal law is captioned "Consultation Required,"33o the 
substantive requirements placed upon states are nothing more than a 
requirement to give notice. But the states should go further, engaging the 
CFPB to test their theories and to consider implications they may have 
overlooked. The CFPB has expressly invited the states to engage the agency 
in this manner.33' Outside this informal process, the CFPB also has limited 
formal means to circumscribe the power of states if it believes the value of 
predictability is threatened. The agency can intervene and remove 
enforcement actions to federal district court.33• And the CFPB can always 
327. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
328. See infra note 325. 
329. Although my focus has been on state-federal coordination of investigations and 
enforcement actions, the same coordination should develop among states. This coordination is 
critical for many of the same reasons that state-federal coordination is important. Additionally, 
for the first time the states have the power to enforce a uniform body of consumer financial 
protection laws, which could significantly lower the costs of coordinated action. The NAAG 
should seek to facilitate these partnerships. 
330. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 
§ 1042(b), 124 Stat. 2012 (2o1o). 
331. State Official Notification Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 39112-o1, 39113 Uune 29, 2012) ("The 
Bureau, however, encourages State Officials and other Federal law enforcement agencies to 
consult with the Bureau regarding issues related to enforcement of Federal consumer financial 
law, especially the Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition on unfair, deceptive and abusive acts and 
practices. The Bureau will make resources available through its Office of Enforcement to 
provide consultation on such issues as needed, even if the action is not one for which the 
Bureau requires notification."). 
332. Dodd-FrankAct§ 1042(b)(2). 
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promulgate regulations under the open-ended UDAAP standard. 
Regulation, however, is not merely a means to limit the power of states; it 
can also augment state power, since the statute empowers states to enforce 
UDAAP regulations against federal depositories.333 
3· Rulemaking 
A final avenue for coordination is rulemaking. Unique to federal 
administrative law, Title X includes a provision that requires the CFPB to 
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking when a majority of the states enact 
resolutions in support of a new rule.334 Although the decision is ultimately in 
the hands of the CFPB, taking into account costs and benefits, implications 
for safety and soundness, and other concerns,335 this provision gives the 
states considerable power to shape federal law, if only because of the public 
attention any such action would garner. State attorneys general, perhaps 
working through the National Association of Attorneys General, are in the 
best position to coordinate these efforts. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The enforcement power Congress gave the states under Title X has 
implications at several levels, including consumer finance and American 
federalism. My purpose here is limited. I do not offer a normative account, 
but rather identify key questions and offer a few preliminary observations 
about where such an account might go. I offer these observations as part of a 
nascent but important conversation that has emerged over the past few years 
about dual-enforcement schemes.336 This growing body of scholarship 
provides the foundation for a normative assessment of the role states play in 
federal consumer financial protection. At the same time, the dual-
enforcement scheme under Title X provides a rich source of materials for 
testing these ideas and advancing the conversation. 
A. CONSUMER FINANCE 
A normative assessment of Title X's system of dual-enforcement and its 
contribution to protecting consumers in the financial marketplace will need 
to consider two main questions. First, do the benefits outweigh the costs? 
And second, should Congress or the CFPB consider any regulatory 
modifications to maximize benefits and reduce costs? 
333· See supra notes 1 oo and accompanying text. 
334· Dodd-FrankAct§ 1041(c)(1). 
335· ld. § 1041 (c)(2). 
336. See supra note 4· More recent scholarship on concurrent regulatory regimes has also 
contributed to this conversation. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the 
Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2oog). 
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The emerging body of scholarship on dual-enforcement regimes has 
produced a fairly consistent list of potential costs and benefits that can serve 
as reference points to measure success.337 Benefits include force 
multiplication, local knowledge, accountability, democratic participation, 
and innovation. At a basic level, empowering state attorneys general to 
enforce federal consumer financial protection law augments the number of 
enforcers. Moreover, these state actors bring to the table local knowledge 
that distant federal enforcers may lack. The last three benefits I discuss in 
the next Subpart. 
At the same time, concurrent-enforcement regimes may also incur 
several costs, including over-enforcement, nonuniformity in federal law, 
federal policy distortion, and redundancy expenses.33s Although any 
enforcement scheme is vulnerable to over-enforcement, spreading this 
authority to fifty state actors who do not finally answer to the executive 
branch of the federal government heightens the risk. This multiplicity also 
introduces a greater chance of nonuniformity in federal law, increasing 
compliance costs. A federal agency with exclusive enforcement authority has 
much greater control over the interpretation of federal law. And lastly, the 
powers Congress gave the states under Title X have the potential to generate 
redundancy costs. State and federal government may bear these costs in the 
form of overlapping enforcement expenses and industry may bear them as 
expenses associated with monitoring and responding to multiple enforcers. 
In measuring the success of the Dodd-Frank dual-enforcement scheme 
by applying these factors, future normative work should keep in mind three 
guiding principles. First, despite some of the political rhetoric surrounding 
the Dodd-Frank Act, Title X includes several safeguards to limit the exercise 
of state power, and Congress can employ other measures as well, if needed. 
These safeguards include the state's obligation to give notice before 
bringing an enforcement action;339 The CFPB's right of intervention and 
removal;34° the restriction on state's enforcing the statutory UDAAP ban 
against federal depositories;w the CFPB's power to define UDAAP through 
regulation,34• possibly closing the door to broader applications championed 
by one or more states; and a limited but still extant power to preempt state 
law.343 In addition, while the office of state attorney general has several 
337· See Barkow, supra note 4, at 56-58; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 336, at 1284-
91; Lemos, supra note 4· at 744-64; Rose, supra note 4, at g-t6; Widman, supra note 4• at 2og-
14; Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 948-53. 
338. See supra note 239· 
339· Dodd-Frank Act§ 1042(b). 
340. !d. 
341. !d.§ 1042(a)(2). 
342- /d.§I031(b). 
343· !d.§§ 1044-1046. 
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inherent incentives to bring enforcement actions, it also has inherent 
restrictions such as limited resources.H4 
As a second guiding principle, scholars and policymakers should keep 
in mind that measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the states' 
enforcement role under Title X is complicated by the enactment of multiple 
reforms. This renders it difficult to isolate causation and assign praise or 
blame, and it requires careful attention to the ways in which these reforms 
interact with one another. As mentioned earlier, Congress employed at least 
three strategies to bolster consumer protection in the financial marketplace: 
institutional design, new substantive rules, and federalism-based strategies.345 
In terms of agency design, Congress consolidated powers previously 
dispersed among many agencies within the new CFPB, charged the new 
agency with the sole mission of protecting consumers, and preserved a 
steady stream of funding independent of Congressional whim and the 
choices of regulated entities. Congress also created new substantive norms 
for federal and state agencies to enforce, including the mortgage rules 
under Title XIV, and the broad UDAAP ban that vests significant discretion 
in the hands of enforcers to address evolving threats to consumers. Finally, 
Congress employed the forces of federalism: limiting agency preemption of 
state laws and empowering states to enforce federal law. The sheer scope of 
reforms under Title X complicates the task of assessing what works and what 
does not, but also provides rich opportunities to see how various strategies 
interact with one another. 
As a third guiding principle, any future amendments to this dual-
enforcement scheme must rest upon solid analysis of how the states, the 
CFPB, and other federal agencies exercise their powers.346 Amanda Rose 
identifies several relevant factors, including the rationale for federal 
regulation, the breadth of any substantive prohibitions, the presence of 
safeguards limiting the role of states, the availability of parallel state 
regulatory power, and the character of enforcement by state and federal 
344· For a discussion of how the office of state attomey general and its defining 
characteristics--especially in the vast majority of states that elect the officer-affect the quality 
of state enforcement see Lemos, supra note 4• at 717-35; Rose, supra note 4• at 27-30; Widman, 
supra note 4, at 212. 
345· See generally Barkow, supra note 4, at 72-78 (summarizing various strategies). 
346. See Lemos, supra note 4• at 754 ("Striking the correct balance requires answering a 
series of context-specific empirical questions regarding the actual practices of state, federal, and 
private enforcers and the effects of enforcement on regulated entities."); Rose, supra note 4, at 
8 ("The point to take away is that although contexts differ, a sophisticated analysis of a 
concurrent state-federal enforcement regime requires more than an ad hoc-and potentially 
biased-weighing of costs and benefits. Attention to the context-specific factors identified in 
this Article is critical to distinguishing, on a principled basis, the settings where concurrent state 
enforcement is likely to be beneficial and those where it is likely to be detrimental, or at least of 
questionable value."). 
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actors.347 Each of these considerations is critical to weighing the costs and 
benefits of Title X's concurrent-enforcement regime. The CFPB is a new 
federal agency with no track record. How the agency exercises its 
enforcement powers, and cooperates or competes with the states, will 
necessarily shape any normative assessment of the states' role under Title X. 
The states do have a track record in other areas,348 although the only 
empirical study in the consumer protection context suggests that states have 
been slow to employ these powers.349 Moreover, experiences in other dual-
enforcement schemes may not be predictive. Title X creates a vastly broader 
regime than anything prior in the area of consumer financial protection. 
Moreover, states have been active in this area in the past and have been 
restricted, in part, not by their own decisions but by agency preemption. 
B. FEDERALISM 
The implications of the Dodd-Frank dual-enforcement scheme extend 
not only to immediate concerns about whether these reforms produce the 
optimal level of consumer protection, but also to the broader role such 
regimes play in American federalism. The scale of this scheme in an area 
where state attorneys general have traditionally been active, its defining 
features, its relationship to others reforms, and the recent history of agency 
capture all render it an important case study. 
As states begin to exercise their new powers under Title X, scholars will 
have opportunity to test and refine several recurrent claims about the role of 
concurrent-enforcement regimes in a federalist system. I briefly mention five 
such claims, before considering several new insights this regime may offer. 
1. Recurrent Claims 
The first and most frequent claim is that concurrent-enforcement 
regimes remedy under-enforcement by holding federal agencies 
accountable to enforce federal law or filling in gaps with state 
enforcement.3so This accountability may be critical to counter agency 
capture, but can also check agency inaction due to other circumstances such 
as resource-allocation decisions or simple bureaucratic delay. Concurrent-
enforcement powers position states as both cooperators and competitors: at 
times working with the federal agency to carry out Congress's ends, but 
other times exercising powers that an agency may refuse or fail to employ. 
Not only does a dual-enforcement system provide an additional layer of 
347· 
348. 
55-61. 
Rose, supra note 4• at 15-31. 
See supra notes go--g8 and accompanying text. See also Widman & Cox, supra note 4• at 
349· Widman & Cox, supra note 4· at 81-8 2. 
350. See Barkow, supra note 4• at 56-58; Lemos, supra note 4, at 702-o3; Rose, supra note 4• 
at 13-14; Widman, supra note 4• at 213-14; Wilmarth, sufrranote 3, at 94g-5o. 
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enforcement if the federal agency neglects its duties, but the enforcement 
actions of even one state attorney general can also garner media attention 
and shine a public light on agency dereliction. 
The concurrent powers created under Title X offer an important 
testing ground, both because of the scale of powers conferred and because 
of the recent experience of federal banking agencies arguably captured by 
the industries they regulate. Faced with aggressive state attorneys general 
does the agency exercise its intervention powers? Does the agency go 
further, promulgating rules to circumscribe the potential reach of the 
UDAAP ban in an attempt effectively to "preempt" state enforcement 
actions? In addition, the Title X scheme provides the opportunity to test 
fears about possible costs, such as over-enforcement and nonuniformity in 
federal law. 
A second claim is that concurrent-enforcement regimes bolster 
democratic participation at the federal leveLs&• This dynamic is both more 
apparent and more discussed in the context of "cooperative federalism" 
schemes, where Congress gives the states regulatory power under broad 
statutory mandates. But this same dynamic can arise in the context of dual-
enforcement regimes as well. Even where Congress has placed rulemaking 
powers solely in the hands of a federal regulator, the power to enforce 
federal law opens up opportunities for state influence. 
Concurrent-enforcement regimes potentially strengthen democratic 
participation in two ways. First, empowering states to enforce federal law 
allows state attorneys general to acljust the level of enforcement in a state by 
providing greater consumer protection.s&• Second, these schemes allow state 
attorneys general who are more directly connected to citizens (and most of 
whom are elected) the opportunity to shape law that is otherwise in the 
hands of unelected federal administrators. This dynamic is especially true 
where Congress has given states power to enforce a broad statutory 
prohibition, such as the UDAAP ban. Such standards vest considerable 
discretion and, as a consequence, policymaking authority, in the hands of 
the enforcer. Although courts have the ultimate say and at most a state 
attorney general would enjoy Skidrrwre deference,s53 the ability to set a policy 
and argue for it in court is an opportunity to shape the meaning of federal 
law in the absence of agency rulemaking. Policy-setting by the states under a 
broad prohibition also has the potential to influence agencies in less formal 
ways by shedding light on the shortcomings of alternative interpretations or 
suggesting novel interpretations the federal agency may have not 
considered. 
351. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 336, at 478-81; Lemos, supra note 4, at 740. 
352. See Lemos, supra note 4, at 746-47. 
353· Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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A third and related claim is that dual-enforcement schemes strengthen 
federal separation of powers.354 State attorneys general create a new line of 
accountability for the executive branch vis-a-vis Congress, as they step in to 
argue that a federal agency is not following the will of Congress. Title X's 
UDAAP ban, and in particular its inclusion of "abusive" along with a 
statutory definition, is an obvious place where states might play this role. 
In addition, a fourth claim is that dual-enforcement regimes harness the 
power of states as laboratories of democracy. Giving states regulatory power 
under a scheme of cooperative federalism is not the only means to 
encourage innovation: shared enforcement powers can produce a similar 
benefit, including new applications of the law, a focus on targets neglected 
by federal enforcers, or fashioning new remedies. The idea is that these 
systems can alter not only the quantity of enforcement, but its quality as well. 
This dynamic is due in part to differences between the actors: unelected 
federal administrators versus (usually) elected state attorneys general. As 
Adam Levitin has argued, many SAGs are "normative entrepreneurs" whose 
direct political accountability to the citizenry often creates incentives for 
innovation, given the political benefits of high-profile consumer-protection 
enforcement.3ss 
And finally, a fifth claim is that concurrent-enforcement regimes foster 
democratic participation and accountability at the state level by giving state 
attorneys general powers they may otherwise lack under state law. Lemos 
emphasizes the importance of dual-enforcement schemes in "breaking open 
the black box that represents 'the state' to reveal the diverse group of state 
actors within."3s6 These schemes, she argues, empower state actors who may 
represent different constituencies other than the state legislature or who are 
more responsive to their needs given the role of the office in responding to 
consumer complaints.3s7 This result promotes democracy. 
The effect of concurrent-enforcement regimes on state separation of 
powers, however, is a topic deserving more attention.3ss As mentioned 
above, empowering state attorneys general to enforce federal law has the 
ability to strengthen federal separation of powers, holding the federal 
executive more accountable to the will of Congress. And yet at the same 
time, this arrangement has the potential to weaken separation of powers at 
the state level, giving the state attorney general powers the state legislature 
may have expressly denied the office. Under Title X, the state attorney 
general-a creation of state constitutional, statutory, and common law-now 
354· See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 336, aq 78-81, 486--92. 
355· Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic &gulation: &gulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON 
REG. 143, 199-200 (2009); see also Provost, supra note 271. 
356. Lemos, supra note 4· at 746. 
357· ld. at 745-48. 
358. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State 
and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Contro~ 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201 (1999). 
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has sweeping authority to exercise similar powers in the area of consumer 
financial protection because of an act of Congress. While a state legislature 
could pass a law denying the state attorney general authority to exercise 
these concurrent powers, this avenue may, as a practical matter, be closed. 
Although Lemos's argument in favor of this dynamic may prove persuasive, 
the matter is worthy of close attention. 
2. New Insights 
In addition to testing recurrent themes, the power Congress bestowed 
upon the states in the Dodd-Frank Act also brings to light several 
considerations that have not received much attention in the literature and 
deserve further exploration. First, Title X raises the question whether 
concurrent-enforcement regimes have the potential to foster indirect 
competition between federal agencies and thereby enhance accountability. 
The attention on accountability so far has focused on direct competition 
between the states and a single federal regulator. The regulatory structure 
created under Title X, however, opens up the possibility for one federal 
agency to partner with one or more states to hold another federal agency 
accountable. 
As mentioned earlier, Congress consolidated consumer financial 
protections powers in the CFPB, but not completely. In the case of federal 
depositories with less than $10 billion in assets, the enforcement of federal 
consumer financial law by federal regulators remains exclusively within the 
domain of the prudential regulator.3s9 The CFPB enforcement power 
against federal depositories is limited to the largest actors.360 At the same 
time, except for the limitation on only enforcing CFPB regulations against 
federal depositories, state attorneys general enjoy broader jurisdiction to 
enforce federal consumer financial laws than any one federal agency.36 • 
Divergent commitment levels to consumer protection among federal 
agencies are easily conceivable, given measures to insulate the CFPB from 
political pressures and the manifold mission of the prudential regulators. 
The regulatory structure created under Title X opens a space for tile CFPB 
to partner closely with one or more state attorneys general to bring 
enforcement actions and foster accountability where a prudential regulator 
fails to act for whatever reason. 
Second, Title X gives scholars and policymakers the opportunity to 
assess whether empowering states to enforce federal law may foster greater 
accountability when paired with a collective state power to initiate 
rulemaking. Although the decision to issue a final regulation remains in the 
359· Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 
§ 1026(d), 124 Stat. 2012 (2010). 
360. /d.§ 1025(c). 
361. /d.§ 1042. 
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hands of the CFPB, the agency is required to issue a notice of proposed 
rulemaking whenever a majority of states enact a resolution in support of 
creating or modifying a consumer protection regulation.36• If the CFPB 
decides not to issue such a rule, the agency must publicly state its reasons. 
This mechanism is novel in administrative law and, like the dual-
enforcement regime, employs the forces of federalism to enhance 
accountability where an agency fails to exercise its regulatory power. 
Although it remains to be seen whether states exercise this power, it 
potentially serves an important function-witness the Federal Reserve's 
failure to stop the most egregious mortgage lending practices leading up to 
the 2008 crisis, despite having rulemaking power to do so.363 Given their 
focus on consumer protection issues, state attorneys general are obvious 
point persons to shepherd such resolutions through the state legislature, 
with the NAAG perhaps playing an organizing role.s64 Pairing this power to 
initiate federal rulemaking with concurrent-enforcement powers may 
increase the incentives for state attorneys general to exercise the former, 
since SAGs would have direct power to enforce these rules across the 
landscape of consumer finance, including against federal depositories. 
Third, this dual-enforcement regime provides an important testing 
ground for considering how federal agencies should expend their limited 
enforcement resources, given the ability of states to bring many of the same 
actions. Dodd-Frank is an especially useful scheme to explore this question 
because of the comprehensive nature of the statute and the breadth of state 
authority. Should the CFPB, and the other federal agencies with 
enforcement powers, partner with consumer-friendly state attorneys general 
to bolster their efforts? Or might the agencies concentrate more resources 
in those states where consumer financial protection does not have strong 
political support? The answer to these questions will depend in part on 
political will, which may often diverge between federal agencies, and also on 
the perceived deterrent value of specific enforcement actions which can 
have spillover effects across state borders. These questions have both 
normative and empirical dimensions which future research will want to 
explore. 
Fourth, and finally, congressional reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act 
provide an opportunity to consider the effectiveness of a concurrent-
enforcement strategy when paired with a constrained preemption strategy, 
and the effect these strategies have on each other. As mentioned earlier, 
Congress adopted multiple strategies in Title X to reform the federal system 
of consumer financial protection.365 These two strategies both employ the 
362. See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
363. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
364. See NAT'LAss'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 202, at 5· 
365. See supra Part I. 
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forces of federalism in service of increasing consumer protection and agency 
accountability. 
Congress's decision to limit, although not eliminate, agency 
preemption of state law is, in one respect, surprising. As Amy Widman has 
observed, a common compromise in Congress is to create dual-enforcement 
powers "in exchange for the absolute preemption of state laws."366 Moreover, 
Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill-in many ways the academic architects 
of Title X-suggested in their seminal article that preemption in the area of 
consumer financial protection was appropriate.367 Although Warren became 
a strong proponent of state attorneys general playing a key role under the 
Dodd-Frank Act during her short tenure at the CFPB,s68 her original 
proposal did not include any role for the states. Nonetheless, Congress not 
only endowed state attorneys general with enforcement power but also 
limited the ability of federal agencies to preempt state law, ensuring that 
federal law would serve as a floor but not a ceiling.s6g 
Future research will want to pay close attention to the interplay between 
these two strategies. States have not yet rushed to pass new laws, but 
Congress only recently granted this power. State leaders may have not yet 
absorbed these changes, and a consumer-friendly CFPB under the Obama 
administration may lower incentives to pass legislation. A revival of state 
regulation could dampen a state's readiness to exercise its concurrent-
enforcement powers, as it might instead prefer to enforce its own laws 
without the safeguards included in Title X. If states opt for state regulatory 
power over enforcing federal law, then costs such as over-enforcement and 
nonuniformity could increase. On the other hand, adopting both 
federalism-based strategies may be strong medicine for a stubborn malady. 
Despite the Title X reforms, the CFPB and the other agencies remain 
366. Widman, supra note 4• at 207. 
367. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 83 ("The erosion of state power in itself need not 
be problematic from a consumer protection perspective. In an era of interstate banking 
uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level may well be more efficient 
than a litany of consumer protection rules that vary from state to state. The problem is not in 
the federal preemption; it is in the failure of federal law to offer a suitable alternative to the 
preempted state law."); id. at g8 n.323 (rejecting a federalism strategy that reverses the trend 
toward preemption and restores state regulatory power, on the grounds that some states would 
not exercise their powers, some states would not have the resources, and it would lead to 
nonuniformity in federal law). 
368. See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, Warren Deputizes 50 State Attorneys General in Bid to Regulate 
U.S. Banks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news/2oto-
1 2-o2 I elizabeth-warren-recruits-dodd-frankenforcers-from-so-states.html. 
369. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 
§§ 1044-1046, 124 Stat. 2012 (2010). 
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susceptible to capture and recourse to state regulatory power may serve as an 
alternative means of accountability.37° 
CONCLUSION 
Empowering states to enforce federal law was only one of multiple 
strategies Congress employed in the wake of the Great Recession to protect 
consumers in the financial marketplace. Nonetheless, this strategy is critical. 
The decade preceding the economic crisis demonstrates that agency design 
matters. And yet no agency is immune from capture. The same decade also 
shows that substantive rules matter. And yet an unenforced rule has little 
value. The vital third leg of the consumer protection stool is states: as 
cooperative but also competitive co-enforcers. 
The success of this dual-enforcement scheme, however, is far from 
certain. On paper it is promising. But how the states exercise these powers 
has the potential to help or harm. Enforcement in any real-world 
application is always discretionary. And state attorneys general are, at most, 
volunteers. While Congress can command federal agencies or induce state 
action through federal largesse, it lacks either mechanism in this instance to 
affect the actions of fifty state attorneys general representing fifty sovereigns. 
For this reason, the steps from paper to practice are especially 
important. The principle contribution of this Article is to illuminate a path 
forward: placing Title X's concurrent-enforcement scheme in the context of 
recent history; interpreting the scope of state substantive, procedural, and 
remedial powers under federal and state law; identifying implementation 
priorities; and then charting a path for normative accounts assessing the 
implications of this scheme for consumer finance and American federalism. 
370. For an argument in favor of both concurrent enforcement and constrained 
preemption, see Widman, supra note 4• at 169 n.17, 215. 
